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NOTES
USING JOHNSON V. UNITED STATES TO
REFRAME RETROACTIVITY FOR SECOND OR
SUCCESSIVE COLLATERAL CHALLENGES
Thomas H. Gabay*
The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) provides a fifteen-year
mandatory minimum sentence in federal prison for persons with at least
three prior “violent felony” convictions who are subsequently convicted of
being in possession of a firearm. In Johnson v. United States, the U.S.
Supreme Court struck down one portion of this statute on the ground that it
was unconstitutionally vague. In addition to an enumerated list of “violent
felonies” that can result in a conviction, this portion included a catchall
category that defined a violent felony as a crime that “otherwise involves
conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”
This Note examines whether federal prisoners, whose convictions and
sentences under this now-unconstitutional prong of the ACCA were final
before Johnson, and who have previously petitioned for habeas corpus, may
again petition in federal court based on Johnson’s holding. In other words,
the question, which has become the subject of a widening circuit split and is
under review by the Supreme Court, is whether Johnson’s new rule about
the unconstitutionality of the ACCA has been “made retroactive . . . by the
Supreme Court” to federal prisoners seeking habeas corpus relief in
federal court. This Note addresses this question and the circuit split that
has emerged on the issue and concludes that Johnson has indeed been
“made retroactive.” Finally, this Note offers a modified framework for
assessing the retroactivity of new rules to second or successive habeas
petitions.
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 1612
I. THE ACCA, JOHNSON, HABEAS CORPUS, AND THE RETROACTIVITY
DOCTRINE COLLIDE ..................................................................... 1618
A. The ACCA and the Residual Clause ....................................... 1618

* J.D. Candidate, 2017, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2012, Cornell University.
The author would like to thank Professor Thomas H. Lee for his thoughtful guidance
throughout this process.

1611

1612

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

B. Johnson v. United States Holds the Residual Clause Voidfor-Vagueness ....................................................................... 1619
C. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 Provides a Habeas Corpus Mechanism for
Federal Inmates .................................................................... 1620
D. The Retroactivity Doctrine Dictates Whether New Rules
May Be Applied to Habeas Corpus Petitions........................ 1624
1. The Early Retroactivity Doctrine ..................................... 1625
2. Teague v. Lane Provides the Modern Framework for the
Retroactivity Doctrine ..................................................... 1626
3. Tyler v. Cain Controls Retroactivity for Successive
Collateral Challenges ...................................................... 1630
4. Criticisms of Tyler ........................................................... 1633
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT ON JOHNSON RETROACTIVITY............................ 1635
A. The Majority View: The Supreme Court Has Made Johnson
Retroactive to Cases on Collateral Review........................... 1636
1. The Seventh and Sixth Circuits: Johnson Was Made
Retroactive Under Tyler .................................................. 1636
2. The First and Eighth Circuits: Accepting the
Government’s Concession of Retroactivity .................... 1638
B. The Minority View: The Supreme Court Has Not Made
Johnson Retroactive to Cases on Collateral Review............. 1639
1. The Eleventh Circuit: Johnson Has Not Been Made
Retroactive Under Tyler .................................................. 1639
2. The Tenth Circuit: The Supreme Court Has Not Made
Johnson Retroactive Because It Has Yet to Expressly
Hold It Retroactive .......................................................... 1641
3. The Fifth Circuit: Johnson Is Not Substantive and
Therefore Not Retroactive............................................... 1642
III. A PROPOSED RESOLUTION TO THE CIRCUIT SPLIT AND THE TYLER
APPROACH .................................................................................... 1643
A. The Multiple Holdings Approach ........................................... 1645
B. Justice O’Connor’s Easy Example ......................................... 1646
C. The Policy Implications of Finding That Johnson Was Made
Retroactive ............................................................................ 1648
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................... 1650
INTRODUCTION
Consider Abe and Ben, two life-long criminals.1 Abe’s criminal
playground is Florida, whereas Ben spends his time breaking the law in
Missouri. During the course of their respective criminal careers, they are
each convicted of three “violent felonies,”2 including attempted burglary.
1. This hypothetical is loosely adapted from the facts of In re Rivero, 797 F.3d 986
(11th Cir. 2015), and Woods v. United States, 805 F.3d 1152 (8th Cir. 2015) (per curiam).
2. For a definition of “violent felony,” see infra note 50 and accompanying text.
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They are each arrested a fourth time and convicted of being felons in
possession of a firearm.3 This subjects each to mandatory minimum
sentences of fifteen years in prison, because they have three prior violent
felony convictions.4 The federal appellate court affirms their convictions
and the U.S. Supreme Court denies certiorari, rendering their convictions
final.5
End of story? Not quite. During their incarcerations, the Supreme Court
limits the scope of the statute that characterizes a prior conviction as a
“violent felony”—the same statute under which Abe and Ben were both
sentenced.6 Abe and Ben, each with a penchant for jailhouse lawyering,
decide to collaterally challenge their sentences in federal court7 under 28
U.S.C. § 2255.8 But, their petitions are denied.9
After several years, the Supreme Court holds unconstitutional the
provision under which Abe and Ben were sentenced; a prior conviction of
attempted burglary no longer constitutes a violent felony.10 Thus, if Abe
and Ben had been sentenced now, they would have been sentenced to a
maximum of ten years, not a minimum of fifteen.11 They both petition again
under § 2255 to challenge their sentences.12 Ben is successful but Abe is
not. Because this is their second time filing § 2255 motions, the procedural
threshold they must overcome is much more burdensome than the first
instance threshold.13 The federal jurisdiction in which Ben is incarcerated
finds that Ben has met this threshold but the jurisdiction in which Abe finds

3. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2012) (rendering it unlawful for a felon to be in possession
of a firearm); infra note 45 and accompanying text.
4. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (codifying the Armed Career Criminal Act); infra Part I.A.
5. A conviction and sentence are considered final when the defendant has completed a
direct appeal and petitioned to the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. See Lyn S.
Entzeroth, Reflections on Fifteen Years of the Teague v. Lane Retroactivity Paradigm: A
Study of the Persistence, the Pervasiveness, and the Perversity of the Court’s Doctrine, 35
N.M. L. REV. 161, 169–70 (2005).
6. See, e.g., Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 130 (2009) (holding that failure
to report to a penal institution is not a violent felony); Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137,
148 (2008) (holding that driving under the influence is not a violent felony).
7. A collateral challenge—also known as a collateral attack or collateral motion—is
one that occurs after a judgment becomes final. See Brian M. Hoffstadt, Common-Law Writs
and Federal Common Lawmaking on Collateral Review, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1413, 1413 n.1
(2002) (“Collateral review refers to review subsequent to direct appeal . . . .”).
8. Entitled “Federal custody; remedies on motion attacking sentence,” § 2255 codifies
the writ of habeas corpus for federal prisoners and provides a collateral mechanism for
challenging a sentence, called a motion to “vacate, set aside or correct” a sentence. See 28
U.S.C. § 2255 (2012); infra Part I.C.
9. A petition under § 2255 may be denied for various reasons unrelated to the merits of
the claim, including failure to file within the one-year statute of limitations. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255(f).
10. See Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2563 (2015).
11. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) (2012) (providing a maximum term of ten years
imprisonment for violation of § 922(g)).
12. This is considered a “second” petition. See infra note 28.
13. In the first instance, they must satisfy the requirements of § 2255(f)(3), while in the
second instance they are subject to § 2255(h)(2). See 28 U.S.C. § 2255; infra Part I.C, I.D.2,
I.D.3.
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himself determines that Abe has not.14 Had Abe been incarcerated within
the same jurisdiction as Ben, he too would have obtained relief.15
Since the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Johnson v. United States,16
such disparate treatment of inmates across jurisdictions has become
commonplace.17 In Johnson, the Court held that a portion of the Armed
Career Criminal Act18 (ACCA), known as the “residual clause,”19 was
unconstitutionally vague.20 The ACCA is a sentencing enhancement statute
that mandates a fifteen-year minimum sentence in federal prison to persons
with at least three prior violent felony convictions who are subsequently
convicted of being in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).21
The now unconstitutional residual clause was a catchall phrase that
expanded the definition of violent felony beyond an enumerated list also to
encompass crimes punishable by a term of imprisonment of at least one
year that involve “conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical
injury to another.”22 Johnson held that “[i]nvoking so shapeless a provision
to condemn someone to prison for 15 years to life does not comport with
the Constitution’s guarantee of due process.”23
The Johnson decision has already had significant implications for various
areas of the law.24 But perhaps most important is the question of to what
extent inmates previously sentenced under the residual clause, and thereby
unjustly serving at least five additional years in prison, may use Johnson as
14. Compare Woods v. United States, 805 F.3d 1152, 1154 (8th Cir. 2015) (per curiam)
(authorizing a successive § 2255 petition), with In re Rivero, 797 F.3d 986, 992 (11th Cir.
2015) (denying a successive § 2255 petition). See also infra Part II.
15. See, e.g., Menteer v. United States, 806 F.3d 1156, 1157 (8th Cir. 2015) (authorizing
a successive § 2255 petition). Moreover, had this been their first § 2255 motions (i.e., had
they never previously filed § 2255 motions), they both also likely would have obtained
relief. See infra note 27 and accompanying text; infra Part II.
16. 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).
17. See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
18. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2012); see also infra Part I.A.
19. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii); see also infra Part I.A.
20. See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557.
21. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).
22. Id. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).
23. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2560.
24. See Peter W. Low & Joel S. Johnson, Changing the Vocabulary of the Vagueness
Doctrine, 101 VA. L. REV. 2051, 2109–13 (2015) (discussing Johnson’s impact on the
vagueness doctrine); Stephen R. Sady & Gillian R. Schroff, Johnson: Remembrance of
Illegal Sentences Past, 28 FED. SENT’G. REP. 58, 60 (2015) (arguing that because the United
States Sentencing Guidelines define “crime of violence” in a similar manner to the ACCA’s
definition of “violent felony,” the Guidelines residual clause analogue should also be subject
to a vagueness challenge under Johnson, and suggesting Johnson may have implications for,
inter alia, restitution, mandatory life imprisonment, extradition, sex offender registration,
money laundering, racketeering, restrictions on use of ammunition, and use of minors in
crimes of violence); Leading Cases, Johnson v. United States, 129 HARV. L. REV. 301, 310
(2015) (“Johnson’s impact may well be broader than the majority admits.”); see also Press
Release, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, U.S. Sentencing Commission Adopts Amendment to
Definition of “Crime of Violence” in Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Proposes
Additional Amendments (Jan. 8, 2016), http://www.ussc.gov/news/press-releases-and-newsadvisories/january-8-2016 (adopting amendment for the portion of the Sentencing
Guidelines that resembles the residual clause) [perma.cc/ZZU7-XUEA].
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a basis for resentencing or release.25 Indeed, in the wake of Johnson, some
inmates previously sentenced under the residual clause have been able to
obtain relief by using the Johnson ruling as the basis of a direct appeal26 or
as the basis of an initial petition under § 2255.27 By contrast, inmates
petitioning under § 2255 for at least a second time28 have not been
uniformly granted relief, resulting in a circuit split on whether the rule
announced in Johnson can be used as the basis of a new motion under
§ 2255.29
The key inquiry that the courts have splintered on is whether the new rule
in Johnson—that the residual clause is unconstitutionally vague—has been
“made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court.”30
25. Although no definitive figure exists, it is estimated that approximately 6000
prisoners have been sentenced under the ACCA. See Leah M. Litman, Residual Impact:
Resentencing Implications of Johnson’s Potential Ruling on ACCA’s Constitutionality, 115
COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 55, 56 (2015); see also U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, QUICK FACTS:
FELON IN POSSESSION OF A FIREARM, http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/researchand-publications/quick-facts/Quick_Facts_Felon_in_Possession_FY14.pdf (last visited Feb.
26, 2015) (noting that 10 percent of the 5498 individuals convicted of violating 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g) in 2014 were sentenced under the ACCA) [perma.cc/N7A5-MSJM]. While it is
also unknown how many offenders have been sentenced under the residual clause
specifically, there are potentially hundreds. See Douglas Berman, How Many Federal
Prisoners Have “Strong Johnson Claims” (and How Many Lawyers Will Help Figure This
Out)?, SENT’G L. & POL’Y (June 26, 2015, 11:53 AM), http://sentencing.typepad.com/
sentencing_law_and_policy/2015/06/how-many-federal-prisoners-have-strong-johnsonclaims-and-how-many-lawyers-will-help-figure-this-out.html [perma.cc/8L2C-XHHJ].
26. See, e.g., United States v. Abbott, No. 14-4764, 2015 WL 7888162, at *1 (4th Cir.
Dec. 4, 2015) (per curiam) (vacating sentence and remanding for resentencing on direct
appeal in light of Johnson); United States v. Munoz-Navarro, 803 F.3d 765, 766 (5th Cir.
2015) (same); United States v. Clark, 619 F. App’x 512, 512 (6th Cir. 2015) (per curiam)
(same); United States v. Langston, 800 F.3d 1004, 1005 (8th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (same,
but after remand from the Supreme Court in light of Johnson); United States v. Dixon, 805
F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 2015) (same); United States v. Snyder, 793 F.3d 1241, 1246 (10th
Cir. 2015) (same); United States v. Braun, 801 F.3d 1301, 1302 (11th Cir. 2015) (same).
27. See Leah Litman, Circuit Splits & Original Writs, CASETEXT (Dec. 17, 2015),
https://casetext.com/posts/circuit-splits-original-writs [http://perma.cc/S96H-6EDL]. But see
Harrimon v. United States, No. 15-CV-00152 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 19, 2015) (denying an initial
petition based on Johnson error in light of the Fifth Circuit’s holding in In re Williams),
petition for cert. filed, No. 15-7426 (Dec. 11, 2015). Both Harrimon and Williams, however,
are outliers. See Litman, supra; infra Part II.B.3.
28. Anything other than an inmate’s initial attempt at a collateral challenge under § 2255
is more precisely referred to as a “second or successive” petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2)
(2012); Lyn S. Entzeroth, Struggling for Federal Judicial Review of Successive Claims of
Innocence: A Study of How Federal Courts Wrestled with the AEDPA to Provide
Individuals Convicted of Non-Existent Crimes with Habeas Corpus Review, 60 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 75, 88 (2005). In the interest of concision, this Note refers to motions other than a first
motion under § 2255 simply as “successive.”
29. As of this writing, the First, Second, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have
authorized successive § 2255 motions based on Johnson, while the Fifth, Tenth, and
Eleventh Circuits have denied authorization. See infra notes 187–88 and accompanying text;
see also infra Part II. This Note refers to petitions for habeas relief founded upon the
Johnson ruling as petitions alleging “Johnson error” or “Johnson claims.” Cf. Leah Litman,
Resentencing in the Shadow of Johnson v. United States, 28 FED. SENT’G REP. 45, 45 (2015)
(characterizing § 2255 motions founded on Johnson as “Johnson claims”).
30. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(2)(A), 2255(h)(2). Whether a rule has been “made retroactive
to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court” is a prerequisite finding that a court of
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While in Teague v. Lane31 the Court described its foundational approach to
retroactivity, in Tyler v. Cain32 the Supreme Court specifically articulated
the standard by which a court determines whether a rule has been “made
retroactive” by the Supreme Court to cases on collateral review.33 This
inquiry is distinct from determining whether a new rule is simply
“retroactive” under the Court’s general retroactivity doctrine as detailed in
Teague.34 The Tyler standard for assessing whether a rule has been made
retroactive has been criticized as an onerous one,35 and its inconsistent
application lies at the heart of the current circuit split.
Although scholars have extensively covered the evolution of the ACCA’s
tortured residual clause,36 few have yet to examine thoroughly the circuit
split on Johnson retroactivity while concurrently revisiting the Court’s
precedent on the retroactivity of new rules to successive petitions for writs
of habeas corpus.37 Accordingly, this Note examines the circuit split,
revisits the standard outlined in Tyler, and concludes that Johnson has in
fact been “made retroactive” and should thus uniformly be given retroactive
effect to successive § 2255 motions. In doing so, this Note suggests a
resolution to the circuit split and proposes a modified approach toward
determining retroactivity for successive collateral challenges.
While the Court has recently granted certiorari on the Johnson
retroactivity question and will likely decide it this term38—a fortunate
appeals must make for a successive motion under § 2255 to be authorized. See id.
§ 2244(b)(2)(A); infra Part I.C.
31. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
32. 533 U.S. 656 (2001).
33. See id. at 663 (“[A] new rule is not ‘made retroactive to cases on collateral review’
[by the Supreme Court] unless the Supreme Court holds it to be retroactive.”).
34. See infra Part I.D.2–3. Indeed, this Note specifically addresses the difficulty in
applying the phrasing “made retroactive . . . by the Supreme Court” in accordance with the
standard articulated in Tyler.
35. See Hoffstadt, supra note 7, at 1489 (“The Supreme Court implied, in Tyler v. Cain,
that a more stringent [retroactivity] standard applies due to the statutory language in
§ 2255.”); infra Part I.D.4.
36. See, e.g., Douglas J. Bench, Jr., Collateral Review of Career Offender Sentences:
The Case for Coram Nobis, 45 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 155 (2011); David C. Holman, Violent
Crimes and Known Associates: The Residual Clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 43
CONN. L. REV. 209 (2010); James G. Levine, Note, The Armed Career Criminal Act and the
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines: Moving Toward Consistency, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 537
(2009); Hayley A. Montgomery, Note, Remedying the Armed Career Criminal Act’s Ailing
Residual Provision, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 715 (2010); Jonathan Robe, Note, Violently
Possessed: Johnson As the Vehicle for Limiting Sentencing Enhancement Under the Armed
Career Criminals Act, 10 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 105 (2015); Brett T.
Runyon, Comment, ACCA Residual Clause: Strike Four? The Court’s Missed Opportunity
to Create a Workable Residual Clause Violent Felony Test, 51 WASHBURN L.J. 447 (2012).
37. While limited, there has been excellent coverage. See, e.g., Litman, supra note 25;
Litman, supra note 27; Litman, supra note 29; Low & Johnson, supra note 24; Stephen I.
Vladeck, Using the Supreme Court’s Original Habeas Jurisdiction to “Ma[k]e” New Rules
Retroactive (Dec. 2, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2698351
[https://perma.cc/5TXE-LH7V]; Sady & Schroff, supra note 24.
38. See Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 790 (2016) (granting certiorari); Petition for
Writ of Certiorari at 8, Welch, 136 S. Ct. 790 (No. 15-6418) (“Petitioner asks this Court to
address the question of [Johnson] retroactivity as it applies to cases on collateral review.”).
Although not discussed at length herein, the avenue by which the Johnson retroactivity
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development as the one-year statute of limitations under § 2255 for Johnson
claims is nearing expiration39—this Note respectfully calls on the Court to
find not just that Johnson is retroactive under general retroactivity doctrine,
but also that it has previously been made retroactive. Doing so would allow
the Court simultaneously to cause meritorious Johnson claims to be
reviewed and to remedy the Court’s overall approach toward retroactivity
for successive collateral challenges.40
Accordingly, Part I of this Note provides an overview of the relevant
legal background, including the ACCA, Johnson, habeas corpus, and the
retroactivity doctrine. Part II addresses the circuit split on Johnson’s
retroactive application to successive motions under § 2255. Part III posits
that Johnson has been made retroactive and discusses how a Supreme Court
holding stating that it has been made retroactive will allow the Court to
reframe its problematic approach toward retroactivity for successive
collateral challenges. In particular, Part III argues that Johnson has been
made retroactive by the Court because, to quote from key Supreme Court
precedent, the rule “narrow[ed] the scope of a criminal statute by
interpreting its terms.”41 Part III also proposes a modified framework that
the Supreme Court might consider adopting to determine whether a new
rule has been made retroactive.42 This regime entails a liberal reading of
question has made it to the Supreme Court is also an intricate issue because denials of
authorizations to file successive collateral challenges are not reviewable via certiorari. See
infra note 94 and accompanying text. See generally Vladeck, supra note 37; Steve Vladeck,
Vehicle Problems Vs. Unusual Vehicles: The Supreme Court’s Bizarre Cert. Grant in
Welch, PRAWFSBLAWG (Jan. 8, 2016, 4:22 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/
2016/01/vehicle-problems-vs-unusual-vehicles-the-supreme-courts-bizarre-cert-grant-inwelch.html (discussing the unusual procedural posture of Welch) [perma.cc/9HPF-X3FZ].
39. See infra notes 87–88 and accompanying text.
40. See infra Part III. Although this Note calls on the Court to find that Johnson was
“made retroactive” in the pending Welch case, and a holding in Welch stating that Johnson is
retroactive would reconcile the circuit split, this Note recognizes that the case could also
theoretically—and unfortunately—leave unresolved the question of whether Johnson had
already been “made retroactive.” The petitioner in Welch is contesting the denial of a
certificate of appealability, after a dismissal of an initial § 2255 motion. See Petition for Writ
of Certiorari, supra note 38, at 4. The Court could therefore feasibly hold Johnson
retroactive, but not address, nor need to address, whether Johnson has been “made
retroactive.” Cf. Vladeck, supra note 37, at 5–6 (discussing Harrimon v. United States, a
pending petition for certiorari before judgment petition on a denial of a first Johnson-based
§ 2255 motion that, if granted, could make Johnson retroactive but still leave open the
question of whether it was “made retroactive”). For discussions of the other ways in which
the Court could have specifically addressed the “made retroactive” question, see, e.g., Leah
M. Litman, The Exceptional Circumstances of Johnson v. United States, 114 MICH. L. REV.
FIRST IMPRESSIONS 81, 85–86 (2016) (arguing the Court should grant a petition for an
original writ of habeas corpus or a petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment); Vladeck,
supra note 37 (arguing that the Court should consider the issue in an original writ of habeas
corpus); Steve Vladeck, Is the Solicitor General Playing a Shell Game with the Supreme
Court Over Johnson Retroactivity?, PRAWFSBLAWG (Dec. 16, 2015, 5:33 PM),
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2015/12/is-the-solicitor-general-playing-a-shellgame-with-the-supreme-court-over-johnson-retroactivity.html (recognizing several currently
pending Supreme Court petitions for “extraordinary writs”) [perma.cc/F4BK-D9KP].
41. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351 (2004) (citing Bousley v. United States,
523 U.S. 614, 620–21 (1998)).
42. See infra Part III.B.

1618

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Tyler and results in the general
retroactivity inquiry as described in Teague as the sole test for determining
whether a rule has been made retroactive.43 Finally, Part III concludes by
discussing the policy benefits that would result were the Court to hold that
Johnson has been made retroactive.44
I. THE ACCA, JOHNSON, HABEAS CORPUS,
AND THE RETROACTIVITY DOCTRINE COLLIDE
This part provides the legal background necessary to understand the
circuit split on Johnson retroactivity. Part I.A discusses the ACCA’s
mandatory minimum sentence and the residual clause. Part I.B discusses
the Johnson decision. Part I.C discusses habeas corpus. Finally, Part I.D
discusses the retroactivity doctrine.
A. The ACCA and the Residual Clause
The ACCA imposes a mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years on
an offender who (1) is guilty of being in possession of a firearm in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)45 and (2) has been convicted three times for prior
violent felonies or serious drug offenses.46 Congress passed the ACCA in
1984, as a part of a larger act, in an effort to curb the number of crimes
committed by repeat violent crime offenders by severely punishing their
possession of firearms.47 Congress intended that only prior crimes
indicating that a felon is especially dangerous when in possession of a
firearm should qualify.48 In defining “violent felony,” the statute includes
both an enumerated list of violent felonies and a catchall provision.49 The
ACCA defines a violent felony as
any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one
year . . . that—(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened
use of physical force against the person of another; or (ii) is burglary,
arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves
43. See infra Part III.B.
44. See infra Part III.C. While the change to retroactivity analysis proposed herein
could also be realized through an amendment to § 2255, that avenue is beyond this Note’s
scope. For a discussion on legislative solutions, see Bryan A. Stevenson, The Politics of
Fear and Death: Successive Problems in Capital Federal Habeas Corpus Cases, 77 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 699, 774–76 (2002).
45. Section 922(g) makes it unlawful for a felon to “possess . . . any firearm or
ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2012).
Without the ACCA’s enhancement, violation of § 922(g) carries a ten-year maximum
sentence. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
46. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).
47. See H.R. REP. No. 98-1073, at 1 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3661, 3661.
Congress passed the ACCA in 1984 and in 1986 amended it to its current form. See
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, ch. XVIII, 98 Stat. 1837,
2185 (1984); Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-570, §§ 1401–1402, 100 Stat. 3207
(1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2006)); see also Holman, supra note 36,
at 211 n.1.
48. See Montgomery, supra note 36, at 717.
49. See id. at 717–18.
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conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to
another.50

The emphasized portion of § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the unconstitutional portion
known as the “residual clause.”51
B. Johnson v. United States Holds the Residual Clause
Void-for-Vagueness
In 2010, Samuel Johnson pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of
a firearm in violation of § 922(g).52 In light of Johnson’s extensive
criminal record, the Government requested an enhanced sentence under the
ACCA,53 arguing that “three of Johnson’s previous offenses—including
unlawful possession of a short-barreled shotgun . . . qualified as violent
felonies.”54 The district court agreed with the Government and sentenced
Johnson under the ACCA to the mandatory minimum fifteen years in
prison.55
While Johnson’s other predicate offenses were listed in the statute, his
prior offense of possession of a short-barreled shotgun was not; it fell under
the residual clause.56 After Johnson unsuccessfully appealed his sentence
to the Eighth Circuit,57 the Supreme Court granted certiorari (on direct
appeal) to decide whether unlawful possession of a short-barreled shotgun
qualifies as a violent felony under the residual clause of the ACCA58 and
later requested reargument addressing the residual clause’s compatibility
with the “Constitution’s prohibition of vague criminal laws.”59

50. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (emphasis added).
51. See Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2556 (2015). In the interest of
completeness, this Note recognizes that a new bill, if passed, will reduce the ACCA’s
mandatory minimum sentence from fifteen years to ten years. This would create an
overlapping sentencing range and be applicable retroactively, thus potentially rendering the
circuit split on Johnson retroactivity moot. See Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act of
2015, S. 2123, 114th Cong. (2015). This Note, however, analyzes the circuit split as is,
because while such legislation would be a welcome reform to the federal sentencing
structure, it would not address the problematic holding in Tyler.
52. See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2556.
53. See id.
54. Id.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See United States v. Johnson, 526 F. App’x 708 (8th Cir. 2013) (per curiam).
58. See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2556.
59. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law.”). The void-for-vagueness doctrine “requires that a
penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can
understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement.” Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983). Moreover,
“The prohibition of vagueness in criminal statutes ‘is a well-recognized requirement,
consonant alike with ordinary notions of fair play and the settled rules of law,’ and a statute
that flouts it ‘violates the first essential of due process.’ These principles apply . . . to
statutes fixing sentences.” Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2556–57 (citations omitted) (quoting
Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) and citing United States v.
Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123 (1979)).
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A six-justice majority held that the residual clause was void-forvagueness.60 Recognizing that the residual clause had “‘created numerous
splits among the lower federal courts,’ where it has proved ‘nearly
impossible to apply consistently,’”61 the Court held that it was so vague that
applying an increased sentence under it violated the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment.62 The Court reasoned that two facets of the clause
created “a black hole of confusion and uncertainty”63 and rendered it
unconstitutionally vague.64 First, the residual clause fostered uncertainty
about how to evaluate the risk a crime carried.65 In applying the residual
clause, judges estimated the level of risk using the “judicially imagined
‘ordinary case’ of a crime,” and not “real-world facts or statutory
elements.”66 Accordingly, the Court was unable to articulate a viable
method for assessing which kind of conduct the “ordinary case” of a crime
entailed.67 Second, the residual clause presented uncertainty as to how
much risk the ordinary case had to pose to be considered a violent felony.68
Therefore, by “combining indeterminacy about how to measure the risk
posed by a crime with indeterminacy about how much risk it takes for the
crime to qualify as a violent felony,” the Court held that “the residual clause
produces more unpredictability and arbitrariness than the Due Process
Clause tolerates.”69 The Court ultimately granted Johnson relief and
Although Johnson’s
remanded the case for further proceedings.70
successful challenge was on direct appeal of his ACCA conviction, the
Supreme Court’s holding opened the door to potential federal habeas corpus
petitions under § 2255 by prisoners previously sentenced under the residual
clause.
C. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 Provides a Habeas Corpus
Mechanism for Federal Inmates
When the Supreme Court issues a new ruling rendering a criminal statute
unconstitutional, defendants convicted of a crime under the nowunconstitutional statute have several options for utilizing the new ruling as a
potential route to a remedy. For recently convicted prisoners, a direct

60. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2563. Although the residual clause has been deemed
unconstitutional, the remainder of the statute remains in force. See id.
61. Id. at 2560 (quoting Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 133 (2009) (Alito, J.,
concurring)). Indeed, Johnson was the fifth Supreme Court case to address the residual
clause. See id. at 2559.
62. See id. at 2563.
63. Id. at 2562 (quoting United States v. Vann, 660 F.3d 771, 787 (4th Cir. 2011) (Agee,
J., concurring)).
64. See id. at 2557.
65. See id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 2558.
69. Id.
70. See id. at 2563.
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appeal71 is the procedural path to judicial relief, whether release or a new
trial.72 Inmates who have already lost on direct appeal may instead seek
postconviction relief by petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus ad
subjiciendum.73
Habeas corpus, Latin for “that you have the body”74 and known as the
Great Writ,75 is a centuries-old means for contesting the lawfulness of
detention.76 Habeas corpus is a “collateral” way for a prisoner to challenge
a sentence—meaning without directly challenging substantive guilt of the
offense charge.77 Although of common law origin, the writ of habeas
corpus is presently codified in several places in the U.S. Code.78 The
general provision is 28 U.S.C. § 2241, which grants the Supreme Court and
lower federal courts the power to grant writs of habeas corpus.79 For
prisoners convicted of federal crimes, the more typically utilized § 2255
allows federal prisoners to collaterally challenge a sentence in federal
court.80 Section 2255 provides in pertinent part:

71. A direct appeal involves appealing the conviction and sentence to the relevant court
of appeals and petitioning for a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1291, 1254 (2012). Afterward, a sentence is deemed final. See Entzeroth, supra note 5, at
169–70.
72. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
73. See A. Christopher Bryant, Retroactive Application of “New Rules” and the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 4 (2002).
74. See Habeas corpus, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
75. See Entzeroth, supra note 28, at 78.
76. See United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 210 (1952) (“[The] [p]ower to issue the
writ of habeas corpus, ‘the most celebrated writ in the English law,’ was granted to the
federal courts in the Judiciary Act of 1789.” (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *129)).
77. See Goto v. Lane, 265 U.S. 393, 401 (1924); supra note 7; see also Desist v. United
States, 394 U.S. 244, 262 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“[Habeas corpus] seeks to assure
that no man has been incarcerated under a procedure which creates an impermissibly large
risk that the innocent will be convicted.”); RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART &
WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1245 (6th ed. 2009) (noting
that “habeas lies when the sentencing court lacked jurisdiction—and that jurisdiction is
lacking when the statute under which the defendant was convicted is unconstitutional”). For
further discussion of the Great Writ, see PAUL D. HALLIDAY, HABEAS CORPUS: FROM
ENGLAND TO EMPIRE (2010).
78. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2254, 2255 (2012). The Great Writ is also enshrined in the
Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. I., § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
shall not be suspended . . . .”). For a discussion of the Suspension Clause, see generally Tor
Ekeland, Note, Suspending Habeas Corpus: Article I, Section 9, Clause 2, of the United
States Constitution and the War on Terror, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1475 (2005).
79. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241; Sarah French Russell, Reluctance to Resentence: Courts,
Congress, and Collateral Review, 91 N.C. L. REV. 79, 94 (2012).
80. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255; Bench, supra note 36, at 172. Section 2255 provides an
identical remedy to the common law writ of habeas corpus. See Hill v. United States, 368
U.S. 424, 427 (1962) (noting that § 2255 was enacted to provide “a remedy exactly
commensurate” with habeas corpus relief). Although not of primary relevance to this Note,
§ 2254 is the state analogue to § 2255 and allows state prisoners to collaterally challenge
their sentences in federal court. See Brandon L. Garrett, Accuracy in Sentencing, 87 S. CAL.
L. REV. 499, 524 (2014). In fact, the vast majority of federal habeas petitions are filed under
§ 2254 by prisoners convicted of state crimes. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONER
PETITIONS FILED IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS, 2000, WITH TRENDS 1980–2000 (2002),
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A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of
Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the
sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the
United States . . . or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum
authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move
the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the
sentence.81

Simply stated, § 2255 allows for an inmate to collaterally challenge82 a
sentence that was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the
United States.83
Nearly fifty years after the enactment of § 2255, Congress promulgated
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 199684 (AEDPA),
which amended § 2255 and established several statutory constraints.85
Relevant for present purposes, AEDPA amended § 2255 to include a oneyear statute of limitations on an inmate’s claim,86 which, in the case of
inmates seeking to rely on a new rule as the basis of a claim, “run[s]
from . . . the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the
Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme
Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.”87

http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ppfusd00.pdf (finding that 80 percent of federal habeas
petitions filed in 2000 were from state inmates) [perma.cc/ZR4W-S7ZL].
81. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). While a motion for resentencing or release under § 2255
provides the predominant collateral mechanism for a federal prisoner seeking postconviction
relief, there are other avenues a federal prisoner could pursue—which themselves carry
procedural hurdles—such as a petition under § 2241. See Bench, supra note 36, at 175;
supra note 79 and accompanying text. Although rare, a federal prisoner may also seek an
“extraordinary writ” from the Supreme Court, such as an original writ of habeas corpus or an
original writ of mandamus. See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 658 (1996); Litman, supra
note 27; Stevenson, supra note 44, at 756–57; Vladeck, supra note 37, at 7–9. While these
mechanisms are not addressed here, they are additional ways the question of whether
Johnson was made retroactive can be heard by the Supreme Court. See supra note 40 and
accompanying text.
82. For ease of exposition, this Note refers to § 2255 motions, habeas petitions,
collateral challenges, and variations thereof interchangeably.
83. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 77, at 1303, 1307. Although a simplified explanation
of claims cognizable under § 2255, it is sufficient for the purposes of this Note, as Johnson
claims are widely regarded as constitutional. See Litman, supra note 29, at 47; see also infra
Part II. Nevertheless, other claims of sentencing error, including nonconstitutional error,
may be cognizable under § 2255 if the alleged error involves “a fundamental defect which
inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S.
178, 185 (1979) (quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962)); see also Russell,
supra note 79, at 96, 105–06.
84. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
85. See Garrett, supra note 80, at 524; Russell, supra note 79, at 96–97.
86. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). This statute of limitations was a departure from traditional
habeas doctrine, which recognized no limitations period. See Hoffstadt, supra note 7, at
1414.
87. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3) (emphasis added). For inmates seeking to allege Johnson
error, the limitations period began on June 26, 2015, and will expire in June 2016. This Note
only considers the retroactivity problem for timely filed successive § 2255 motions alleging
Johnson error. There are ways, however, for an untimely motion still to obtain review,
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In effect, under § 2255 an inmate can only assert a claim anchored upon a
new Supreme Court ruling within one year of that ruling, so long as that
ruling is retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.88
In addition to the one-year statute of limitations, AEDPA established
several “gatekeeping” restrictions on successive § 2255 petitions.89 As
relevant here, AEDPA imposed § 2255(h)(2), which mandates that before
an inmate relying on a new rule of constitutional law may move for a
successive time under § 2255, the motion “must be certified as provided in
section 2244 by a panel of the appropriate court of appeals to contain . . . a
new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral
review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.”90 Section
2244, in turn, provides that the movant must first petition to the circuit court
in the jurisdiction where he or she was sentenced for an order authorizing
the district court to consider the successive motion.91 The circuit court may
only authorize the motion if it determines that the petitioner made a prima
facie showing that the new rule was made retroactive by the Supreme Court
per the requirements of § 2255(h)(2).92 If such showing is made, only then
will the inmate have leave to file a successive § 2255 motion with the
district court.93 Finally, the grant or denial of an authorization “shall not be
appealable and shall not be the subject of a petition for rehearing or for a
writ of certiorari.”94

including equitable tolling in situations involving a fundamental miscarriage of justice or
actual innocence. See Litman, supra note 40, at 87.
88. See infra Part I.D (discussing AEDPA’s interaction with the Court’s retroactivity
doctrine). An additional hurdle is procedural default. Briefly, if an inmate could have, but
failed to raise a claim on direct appeal, the doctrine of procedural default prevents the inmate
from raising that claim on collateral review. See Litman, supra note 27. Although Johnson
was not previously available to petitioners now seeking relief for Johnson error, a petitioner
would still have to establish cause and prejudice for failing to raise the claim previously. See
id. Nevertheless, the Government has been waiving such procedural arguments on defaulted
Johnson claims. See id.
89. See Vladeck, supra note 37, at 1; Entzeroth, supra note 28, at 90.
90. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2) (emphasis added). Note that the emphasized language is
similar, although not identical, to the retroactivity language in § 2255(f)(3). See supra note
87 and accompanying text. This nuanced difference is of central importance to this Note.
91. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244. Section 2244 also governs the requirements for successive
petitions by state inmates under § 2254. See id.
92. See id. A prima facie showing requires a showing of potential merit sufficient to
“warrant a fuller exploration by the district court.” In re Lott, 366 F.3d 431, 432–33 (6th Cir.
2004) (quoting Bennett v. United States, 119 F.3d 468, 469 (7th Cir. 1997)); see also In re
Williams, 330 F.3d 277, 281 (4th Cir. 2003) (collecting cases). Furthermore, the court of
appeals shall grant or deny the authorization “not later than 30 days after the filing of the
motion.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(a)(3)(D).
93. See Entzeroth, supra note 28, at 90 (“Under the certification process of the AEDPA,
the circuit courts of appeals serve a ‘gatekeeping’ function, and keep the courthouse doors
closed unless an individual meets the narrow criteria of new evidence or new constitutional
law entitling one to a second or successive motion. . . . [I]ts function is to prevent a hearing
on the merits.”).
94. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(a)(3)(E).
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These austere retroactivity provisions95 significantly limit the availability
of collateral relief even on a colorable claim of a new rule, especially on a
successive collateral challenge.96 Before examining how the Supreme
Court has most recently interpreted these retroactivity requirements, this
Note turns to a discussion of the retroactivity doctrine generally.
D. The Retroactivity Doctrine Dictates Whether New Rules
May Be Applied to Habeas Corpus Petitions
The retroactivity doctrine is instrumental in determining whether a court
will review an initial or successive § 2255 motion, assuming the motions
are anchored on a new rule of constitutional law made by the Supreme
Court.97 Current retroactivity doctrine dictates that newly decided rules of
constitutional law should not, save for certain exceptions, be available to
defendants whose convictions have become final prior to the new rule’s
announcement.98 The retroactivity doctrine—along with AEDPA—is
consequently a substantial barrier to federal habeas petitions.99
This section begins by providing a brief discussion of the early
retroactivity doctrine in Part I.D.1, before examining the modern Teague
approach in Part I.D.2. Part I.D.3 then addresses the Court’s Tyler decision
on retroactivity for successive collateral attacks. This section ends with a
discussion of the criticisms of Tyler in Part I.D.4.
95. See Jason M. Zarrow & William H. Milliken, The Retroactivity of Substantive Rules
to Cases on Collateral Review and the AEDPA, with a Special Focus on Miller v. Alabama,
48 IND. L. REV. 931, 984 (2015) (discussing the AEDPA provisions that implicate
retroactivity).
96. See Entzeroth, supra note 28, at 90–91 (“[E]ven if the prisoner has a meritorious
claim, if he cannot survive the certification process, the federal court cannot hear his
claim . . . and cannot grant appropriate relief. . . . AEDPA not only restricts the remedies
available to prisoners, but also limits the power of federal courts.”); Ronn Gehring, Tyler v.
Cain: A Fork in the Path for Habeas Corpus or the End of the Road for Collateral Review?,
36 AKRON L. REV. 181, 205 (2002) (“[T]he gatekeeper provision of section 2244(b) is
perhaps the most challenging obstacle inmates must overcome to have a court grant a second
or successive petition.”). Consequently, AEDPA has been heavily criticized. See, e.g., John
H. Blume, AEDPA: The “Hype” and the “Bite”, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 259, 289 (2006)
(arguing AEDPA’s statute of limitations “has deprived thousands of potential habeas
petitioners of any federal review of their convictions”); Stevenson, supra note 44, at 735
(examining AEDPA’s virtual foreclosure on certain constitutional claims that are sometimes
unreviewable until the successive petition stage).
97. A case announces a new rule “if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at
the time the defendant’s conviction became final.” Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103,
1107 (2013) (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989)). Whether a case presents a
new rule is itself a hot-button issue, but one that is beyond the scope of this Note. See
generally Bryant, supra note 73.
98. See Brandon Buskey & Daniel Korobkin, Elevating Substance Over Procedure: The
Retroactivity of Miller v. Alabama Under Teague v. Lane, 18 CUNY L. REV. 21, 27 (2014);
see also Zarrow & Milliken, supra note 95, at 932.
99. See Benjamin Robert Ogletree, The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996, Chapter 154: The Key to the Courthouse Door or Slaughterhouse Justice?, 47 CATH.
U. L. REV. 603, 673 (1998). Although this Note is solely concerned with the retroactivity of
new criminal rules, retroactivity doctrine is also implicated in the civil context. See generally
Pamala J. Stephens, The New Retroactivity Doctrine: Equality, Reliance, and Stare Decisis,
48 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1515 (1998).
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1. The Early Retroactivity Doctrine
Traditionally, new rules applied without distinction to cases on both
direct and collateral review.100 Under this traditional view of retroactivity,
judges did not create new law, but rather discovered and applied preexisting
law.101 Accordingly, the idea that a particular rule of law did not apply
across the board to all cases was anathema.102 But this view severely
constrained the capacity for the Supreme Court to recognize revolutionary
new rules, especially in the federal constitutional criminal procedure
context.103 And so it came under attack in the mid-twentieth century during
the Warren Court era.104
The Warren Court’s doctrinal solution was articulated in Linkletter v.
Walker.105 The specific question in Linkletter was whether the new
exclusionary rule derived from Mapp v. Ohio106 should apply to state
criminal cases on federal collateral review.107 The Court devised a threeprong balancing test involving an examination of the prior history of the
rule, its purpose and effect, and whether retroactive application would
advance its operation.108 This case-by-case approach was theoretically
useful because it enabled the Court to continue expanding criminal
defendants’ rights without the danger of a flood of habeas petitions from
previously sentenced defendants, as there was then no statute of limitations
on habeas petitions.109 The functional result of the Linkletter standard,
however, was disparate treatment of similarly situated individuals and
arbitrary retroactive application of new rules.110 Consequently, many

100. See Kendall Turner, Note, A New Approach to the Teague Doctrine, 66 STAN. L.
REV. 1159, 1163 (2014). The retroactivity doctrine is also implicated in the Constitution.
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (“No . . . ex post facto Law shall be passed.”); see also
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798) (defining ex post facto laws). The prohibition against
ex post facto laws is primarily concerned with barring the retroactive application of new
criminal laws to criminalize previously lawful conduct. See Calder, 3 U.S. at 390. This is
distinct from the retroactivity issue discussed herein.
101. See Matthew R. Doherty, Note, The Reluctance Towards Retroactivity: The
Retroactive Application of Laws in Death Penalty Collateral Review Cases, 39 VAL. U. L.
REV. 445, 450–51 (2004).
102. See id. at 451.
103. See Steven W. Allen, Toward a Unified Theory of Retroactivity, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 105, 113 (2010) (“[I]t became increasingly likely that any given state prisoner could
point to some federal procedural right . . . that was violated during that prisoner’s trial.
Thus, an unbridled application of the general retroactivity principle could truly have resulted
in the states being required to throw open their prison doors.”).
104. See Turner, supra note 100, at 1163–64.
105. 381 U.S. 618 (1965); see also Bryant, supra note 73, at 30.
106. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
107. See Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 619–20.
108. See Gehring, supra note 96, at 187. Incidentally, the Linkletter Court held that Mapp
was not retroactive. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 620.
109. See Allen, supra note 103, at 114.
110. See id. (“As between petitioners, the Linkletter approach was in effect a
lottery . . . .”).
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judges and legal scholars, led by Justice Harlan, criticized the Linkletter
approach to retroactivity.111
2. Teague v. Lane Provides the Modern Framework
for the Retroactivity Doctrine
The Linkletter years ended in 1989 with the Court’s decision in
Teague,112 in which Justice O’Connor, writing for a plurality, largely
adopted Justice Harlan’s proffered solution to the retroactivity puzzle.113 In
Teague, the Court recognized the inherent problems with Linkletter114 and
determined that its approach to retroactivity for cases on collateral review
“require[d] modification.”115 Following Justice Harlan, the Court held that
new constitutional rules are always applicable to all cases on direct appeal
and generally not retroactive to cases on collateral review.116 The Court
emphasized the interest in finality, which it characterized as “essential to
the operation of our criminal justice system.”117 The Court did, however,

111. See Doherty, supra note 101, at 453–54; Paul J. Mishkin, Foreword: The High
Court, the Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56, 57–58
(1965). In particular, Justice Harlan grew frustrated with the lack of an established
dichotomy for cases on direct appeal and collateral review and formulated a new approach to
retroactivity. See, e.g., Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 258, 263 (1969) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that new rules should be applied retroactively to cases on direct review,
but generally not to cases on collateral review); Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 688–
89, 701 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in part) (same).
112. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989); see Entzeroth, supra note 5, at 184 (“Teague
v. Lane [is] the pivotal case establishing the modern retroactivity doctrine . . . .”). While
Teague and its progeny originated mostly from state prisoners petitioning for federal habeas
relief, the holdings on retroactivity also apply to petitions from federal prisoners. See
Christopher S. Strauss, Collateral Damage: How the Supreme Court’s Retroactivity
Doctrine Affects Federal Drug Prisoners’ Apprendi Claims on Collateral Review, 81 N.C. L.
REV. 1220, 1240 (2003). See generally Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998)
(discussing Teague in the context of a federal inmate’s habeas motion).
113. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 305–10, 312; see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J.
Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV.
1731, 1746 (1991) (“[In Teague] the Supreme Court accepted the outlines of Justice Harlan’s
approach to retroactivity on habeas corpus.”).
114. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 305 (“Linkletter . . . led to unfortunate disparity in the
treatment of similarly situated defendants on collateral review.”).
115. Id. at 301.
116. See id. at 308.
117. Id. at 309; see also Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on
Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142, 146 (1970) (suggesting finality as a reason for
limited collateral review); Ryan W. Scott, In Defense of the Finality of Criminal Sentences
on Collateral Review, 4 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 179, 185 (2014) (“[T]he government
has a strong interest in preserving . . . a judgment.”). A related theory for limited
retroactivity is to prevent a flood of litigation. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
Still, and of particular importance to this Note, some argue that finality and floodgate
interests are not implicated when a petitioner seeks resentencing as opposed to a
modification of a criminal conviction. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 399 F.3d 450,
456 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding that “the cost of correcting a sentencing error is far less than the
cost of a retrial” because “resentencing is a brief event, normally taking less than a day and
requiring the attendance of only the defendant, counsel, and court personnel”); Russell,
supra note 79, at 82–83 (“Concerns about finality are much less pressing when a court
reconsiders the length of a sentence rather than the validity of a conviction.”); id. at 135
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carve out two exceptions to the general presumption of nonretroactivity on
collateral review: (1) if the new rule places “certain kinds of primary,
private individual conduct beyond the criminal law-making authority to
proscribe,”118 or (2) if the new rule “requires the observance of ‘those
procedures that . . . are “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”’”119
The Supreme Court has on several occasions elaborated on Teague’s first
exception to nonretroactivity.120 The first such elaboration came in Penry
v. Lynaugh,121 where the Court was faced with deciding whether the
execution of the mentally handicapped is unconstitutional and, if so,
whether that decision was retroactively applicable to the petitioner’s claim
on collateral review.122 The Court held that “the first exception set forth in
Teague should be understood to cover not only rules forbidding criminal
punishment of certain primary conduct but also rules prohibiting a certain
category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or
offense.”123 While the Court ultimately ruled that executing the mentally
handicapped was not unconstitutional (at the time),124 its discussion of
Teague’s first exception remains good law.125
In Bousley v. United States,126 the Court further expanded its retroactivity
approach when it determined that Bailey v. United States127 was retroactive
on collateral review.128 In Bousley, the Court emphasized that the Teague
(arguing that in the career offender sentencing context, the number of resentencings would
be “contained”).
118. Teague, 489 U.S. at 311 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971)
(Harlan, J., concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in part)).
119. Id. (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgments in part and
dissenting in part)). “Although Teague was a plurality opinion . . . the Teague rule was
affirmed and applied by a majority of the Court shortly thereafter.” Danforth v. Minnesota,
552 U.S. 264, 266 n.1 (2008) (citing Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 313 (1989)).
120. See, e.g., Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004); Bousley v. United States, 523
U.S. 614 (1998); Penry, 492 U.S. 302, abrogated by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304
(2002); see also Perry L. Moriearty, Miller v. Alabama and the Retroactivity of
Proportionality Rules, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 929, 965–66 (2015) (discussing the
development of the substantive rule exception to nonretroactivity). While the first exception
has been expanded, the second Teague exception—the “watershed” rule exception—has yet
to be applied to a new rule. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 77, at 1246.
121. 492 U.S. 302 (1989), abrogated by Atkins, 536 U.S. 304.
122. See id. at 329.
123. Id. at 330.
124. Id. at 340. This point was overruled thirteen years later. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
125. See Allen, supra note 103, at 125 (“Lower courts, both state and federal, have
unanimously concluded that the Teague discussion in Penry remains in force and that Atkins
is entitled to retroactive application.”). Penry also extended Teague’s applicability from
convictions to sentences. See Zarrow & Milliken, supra note 95, at 960. Nevertheless, the
Penry approach to the first Teague exception is rarely invoked. See Turner, supra note 100,
at 1168 (“Penry has proven to be an anomaly, and its approach contrasts starkly with later
applications of Teague.”).
126. 523 U.S. 614 (1998).
127. 516 U.S. 137 (1995) (holding the word “uses” in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) to mean
active employment of a firearm and not mere possession).
128. See Bousley, 523 U.S. at 621. In Bousley, the petitioner pleaded guilty to “using” a
firearm “during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime.” See id. at 616. On the
petitioner’s first § 2255 motion, the Supreme Court considered whether the new rule in
Bailey should have retroactive effect on the theory that the petitioner’s guilty plea for
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nonretroactivity rule is only applicable to procedural rules, not “to the
situation in which th[e] Court decides the meaning of a criminal statute
enacted by Congress,” which is substantive in nature.129 The Court then
relied on the doctrinal foundations of habeas corpus to draw an analogy as
to why substantive rules, similar to certain procedural rules exempt from
nonretroactivity under Teague, are also entitled to retroactive application.130
The Court asserted that the Teague exceptions are founded upon a principle
function of habeas corpus—“to assure that no man has been incarcerated
under a procedure which creates an impermissibly large risk that the
innocent will be convicted.”131 The Court then asserted that much like the
Teague exceptions, including “decisions placing conduct ‘beyond
the . . . law-making authority to proscribe,’”132 decisions holding that a
federal criminal statute does not reach certain conduct are also
retroactive.133 This is so because their retroactive application similarly
advances a core principle of habeas corpus—mitigating “a significant risk
that a defendant stands convicted of an ‘act that the law does not make
The Court therefore determined that “the doctrinal
criminal.’”134
underpinnings of habeas review” supported the retroactive application of
Bailey to the petitioner’s claim.”135 In short, Bousley provides that a
substantive change in law is retroactive.136
“using” a firearm during a drug trafficking crime was not fully informed and therefore
unlawful. See id. at 617–18. Although Bailey did not provide a new rule of constitutional
law, and hence would not qualify for application to a successive motion under § 2255, this
was a first § 2255 motion, and that requirement was not implicated. Compare 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255(h)(2) (2012) (requiring new rules to be constitutional in nature for use on successive
motions), with id. § 2255(f)(3) (exhibiting no such requirement for using new rules on initial
motions).
129. Bousley, 523 U.S. at 620. The Court essentially combined the two Teague
exceptions into one: certain procedural rules, such as those that place certain conduct
beyond the lawmaking authority to proscribe, and watershed rules of criminal procedure, are
entitled to retroactive application. After combining the two Teague exceptions into one, the
Court simultaneously created an additional species of retroactive rules: rules that are
substantive. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 77, at 1246.
130. See Bousley, 523 U.S. at 620–21.
131. Id. at 620 (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 312 (1989)).
132. Id. (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 311).
133. See id. at 620–21.
134. Id. at 620 (quoting Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974)). By citing
Davis, the Court invoked an older case that, in addressing whether a certain claim was
cognizable on collateral review, discussed the core purposes of habeas corpus. See Davis,
417 U.S. at 346–47 (holding the petitioner’s claim—that he was convicted for an act that the
law does not make criminal—is cognizable under § 2255 because a core function of habeas
is to protect against such risks); see also Doherty, supra note 101, at 460 (“The importance
of the distinction between substance and procedure in the habeas context is rooted in concern
for the principal function of habeas corpus relief, which is to assure that an innocent person
will not stay convicted or incarcerated under a law that is no longer criminal.”); supra note
77 and accompanying text.
135. Bousley, 523 U.S. at 621.
136. See Entzeroth, supra note 5, at 197 (“Bousley appeared to provide that changes in
substantive law would not be subject to the Teague analysis and, as such, substantive
decisions would apply to cases pending in habeas review.”); Doherty, supra note 101, at 460
n.87 (“Bousley stands for the proposition that a change in substantive law must be given
retroactive affect [sic].”). At least one scholar, however, points out that the holding of
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In Schriro v. Summerlin,137 the Court echoed its Bousley approach to the
Teague doctrine. In Summerlin, the petitioner collaterally challenged his
death penalty sentence, arguing that the new rule announced in Ring v.
Arizona138 rendered his sentence unlawful.139 The Court found that Ring
was not entitled to retroactive effect because it was not substantive and did
not meet the Teague exceptions.140 But more importantly, the Court
reiterated its ruling in Bousley, stating new substantive rules, including
“decisions that narrow the scope of a criminal statute by interpreting its
terms, as well as constitutional determinations that place particular conduct
or persons covered by the statute beyond the State’s power to punish,”
generally apply retroactively.141 Such rules, the Court emphasized, are
entitled to retroactive effect “because they ‘necessarily carry a significant
risk that a defendant stands convicted of an act that the law does not make
criminal’ or faces a punishment that the law cannot impose upon him.”142
In the days leading up to this Note’s publication, the Supreme Court’s
retroactivity jurisprudence evolved again with the Court’s decision in
Montgomery v. Louisiana.143 The Court reemphasized that Teague’s first
exception stands for the proposition that substantive rules are entitled to
retroactive effect.144 The Court also stated that Teague requires the
retroactive application of new substantive rules145 and that “when a new
substantive rule of constitutional law controls the outcome of a case, the
Constitution requires state collateral review courts to give retroactive effect

Bousley is not so clear. See Litman, supra note 29, at 49 (“[I]t’s not clear whether the
‘holding’ of Bousley is that all decisions altering the meaning of a criminal statute are
substantive, or whether the ‘holding’ of Bousley is that all decisions interpreting what
conduct the law proscribes are substantive. There is language in the decision to support
either reading.”).
137. 542 U.S. 348 (2004).
138. 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (holding it unconstitutional for a sentencing judge to find an
aggravating circumstance necessary for the imposition of the death penalty).
139. See Summerlin, 542 U.S. at 350–51.
140. See id. at 353, 357–58.
141. Id. at 351–52 (citations omitted). The Court reiterated that rules placing the
particular conduct covered by the statute beyond the state’s power to punish, which
traditionally were considered a Teague exception, are more accurately characterized as
substantive rules not subject to Teague. See id. at 352 n.4. Accordingly, like Bousley, at
least one scholar suggests that Summerlin also “eliminate[d] the first Teague exception and
recognize[d] simply that changes in substantive law are not subject to Teague at all.”
Entzeroth, supra note 5, at 209. Because the substantive rule exception to nonretroactivity
evolved from Teague’s original first exception, this Note refers to such rules as falling
within Teague’s “substantive rule exception” or the “first exception,” although substantive
rules are more precisely not subject to Teague. For a thorough analysis of the substantive
rule exception, see Zarrow & Milliken, supra note 95, at 952–64.
142. Summerlin, 542 U.S. at 352 (quoting Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620
(1998)).
143. No. 14-280, 2016 WL 280758 (U.S. Jan. 25, 2016) (holding that the rule announced
in Miller v. Alabama—that mandatory imprisonment for life without parole for juvenile
homicide offenders is unconstitutional—is substantive and thus retroactive to cases on
collateral review).
144. See id. at *5.
145. See id. at *6.
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to that rule.”146 Moreover, the Court provided a general principle: “[A]
court has no authority to leave in place a conviction or sentence that
violates a substantive rule, regardless of whether the conviction or sentence
became final before the rule was announced.”147
3. Tyler v. Cain Controls Retroactivity for
Successive Collateral Challenges
The pertinent question now becomes, how does the Court’s retroactivity
jurisprudence, as explained by Teague and its progeny, interact with the
retroactivity requirements imposed by AEDPA? Recall that a showing of
retroactivity is necessary for an inmate seeking to rely on a new rule in a
§ 2255 motion.148 For first § 2255 motions,149 an inmate may only use a
new rule within a year of its announcement if the new rule was recognized
by the Supreme Court and retroactively applicable to cases on collateral
review.150 Hence, Courts assess both whether the rule is new and whether
it is retroactive under Teague.151 But despite the fact that § 2255(f)(3) and
§ 2255(h)(2) exhibit very similar retroactivity language, courts do not
employ the same approach in determining the retroactivity of a new rule for
the purposes of successive § 2255 motions. Under § 2255(h)(2), a
petitioner may not file a successive motion unless it is predicated on a new
rule of law that was made retroactive to cases on collateral review “by the
Supreme Court.”152 Section 2255(h)(2)’s use of the operative phrase “by
the Supreme Court” has resulted in a distinct inquiry for establishing
retroactivity for successive § 2255 motions—an inquiry not governed solely
by Teague, but also by the Court’s decision in Tyler.153
146. Id. at *7 (emphasis added).
147. Id. at *10.
148. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2255(f)(3), (h)(2) (2012); supra notes 87–93 and accompanying
text.
149. Recall that “first” or “initial” § 2255 motions refer to an inmate’s first attempt at a
§ 2255 motion, after his or her conviction and sentence have become final. See supra notes
27–28 and accompanying text.
150. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3).
151. See Horn v. Banks, 536 U.S. 266, 272 (2002) (“[I]n addition to performing any
analysis required by AEDPA, a federal court considering a habeas petition must conduct a
threshold Teague analysis when the issue is properly raised.”); Doherty, supra note 101, at
465 (“[T]he Teague analysis remains a seminal inquiry in analyzing retroactivity.”); Scott,
supra note 117, at 190 (“The Supreme Court . . . has consistently applied Teague’s nonretroactivity approach to collateral attacks on sentences.”). In fact, there is a presumption
that at some level, AEDPA codified Teague. See Entzeroth, supra note 5, at 198 (“Congress
used concepts and incorporated language from Teague in several specific attempts to restrict
the scope of habeas review.”); Zarrow & Milliken, supra note 95, at 933 n.16 (collecting
cases debating whether AEDPA codified Teague). But see Greene v. Fisher, 132 S. Ct. 38,
44 (2011) (asserting that AEDPA did not codify Teague). Still, the Greene Court recognized
that while Teague and AEDPA are discrete, “neither abrogates or [sic] qualifies the other.”
Id.
152. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2).
153. Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656 (2001); see also Ellen F. Carey, Closing the Door on
Successive Habeas Petitions: Supreme Court Must Expressly Hold That New Rule Is
Retroactively Available for Collateral Review Under the AEDPA, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
273, 278–79 (2002).
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Tyler is the chief case addressing the retroactivity of new rules to
successive habeas petitions. In Tyler, the Court was tasked with
determining, under AEDPA, whether Cage v. Louisiana154 was entitled to
retroactive effect on a successive collateral challenge.155 The 5-4 Court
determined that the new rule had not been made retroactive by the Supreme
Court because the Court had not expressly held Cage to be retroactive.156
The Court interpreted the word “made” to mean “held” and established that
the requirements for successive collateral challenges are only satisfied when
the Court expressly holds a new rule to be retroactive.157 The Court further
implied that even if Cage—or any new rule—superficially met one of the
Teague exceptions, it still would not be made retroactive unless the Court
expressly held so.158 Moreover, the Court held that a rule is not made
retroactive if the Court establishes principles of retroactivity and leaves the
finding of retroactivity to the lower courts.159 Such a strict interpretation of
the statute was necessary, the Court reasoned, “for the proper
implementation of the collateral review structure created by AEDPA”
because the thirty-day time limit for considering authorizations to file
successive habeas motions implies that the lower courts were not intended
154. 498 U.S. 39 (1990) (per curiam) (finding unconstitutional a jury instruction that
could have been interpreted to allow for conviction without proof beyond a reasonable
doubt).
155. Tyler, 533 U.S. at 658–59. The inmate in Tyler filed a successive motion under
§ 2254, which is the state analogue to § 2255. See supra note 80. Accordingly, the Court in
Tyler interpreted the “made retroactive by the Supreme Court” language as stated in
§ 2244(b)(2)(A) and in the state context. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
Nevertheless, the language in § 2244(b)(2)(A) also applies to federal prisoners seeking to file
successive motions under § 2255 and is identical to the threshold language in § 2255(h)(2).
See supra notes 89–93 and accompanying text. Thus, the holding in Tyler also applies to the
federal successive habeas context. See Hoffstadt, supra note 7, at 1489 n.430 (“Tyler
involved an interpretation of § 2244, but its holding presumably would apply to § 2255,
given the same statutory language.”).
156. See Tyler, 533 U.S. at 663–64.
157. See id. The Court decided that “made” meant “held,” in part through reliance on an
earlier Supreme Court case that invoked a strict reading of a different provision of AEDPA.
See id. at 664 (“To be sure, the statute uses the word ‘made,’ not ‘held.’ But we have
already stated, in a decision interpreting another provision of AEDPA, that Congress need
not use the word ‘held’ to require as much.” (referring to Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,
412 (2000) (holding the phrase “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States,” in § 2254(d)(1) refers to holdings of the Supreme
Court))). Therefore, Tyler is not the only Supreme Court case to produce a conservative
reading of AEDPA. See generally Ursula Bentele, The Not So Great Writ: Trapped in the
Narrow Holdings of Supreme Court Precedents, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 741 (2010)
(criticizing the Williams holding).
158. See Tyler, 533 U.S. at 666 (“The most [the petitioner] can claim is that, based
on . . . Teague, this Court should make Cage retroactive to cases on collateral review. What
is clear, however, is that we have not ‘made’ Cage retroactive to cases on collateral
review.”); Hoffstadt, supra note 7, at 1489 (“Even if a claim is not ‘Teague-barred’ by
application of Teague itself, the claim may still be barred if it is raised in a second or
successive § 2255 motion. . . . [T]he Supreme Court itself has to declare the ‘new rule’
retroactive.”). Notably, while the Court held that Cage had not been made retroactive, the
Court suggested that Cage was not even retroactive under Teague. See Entzeroth, supra note
5, at 214 (“Although the Court declined to state definitively whether Cage is retroactive or
not, the majority certainly hinted that it was not.”).
159. See Tyler, 533 U.S at 663.
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to employ “the difficult legal analysis” necessary to resolve questions of
retroactivity.160 The Court did, however, remark that multiple holdings
may be used to surmise the retroactivity of a new rule, but “only if the
holdings in those cases necessarily dictate” that result.161
In her Tyler concurrence, Justice O’Connor agreed with the majority that
the clearest instance of when the Court has made a rule retroactive is when
the Court has expressly held that the new rule is retroactive.162 Justice
O’Connor emphasized, however, as did Justice Breyer writing for the fourjustice dissent, that two or more cases can logically dictate that a new rule
has been made retroactive by the Supreme Court:
[A] single case that expressly holds a rule to be retroactive is not a sine
qua non for the satisfaction of this statutory provision. This Court instead
may “ma[k]e” a new rule retroactive through multiple holdings that
logically dictate the retroactivity of the new rule. To apply the syllogistic
relationship described by Justice Breyer, if we hold in Case One that a
particular type of rule applies retroactively to cases on collateral review
and hold in Case Two that a given rule is of that particular type, then it
necessarily follows that the given rule applies retroactively to cases on
collateral review. In such circumstances, we can be said to have “made”
the given rule retroactive to cases on collateral review.163

Justice O’Connor further explained that the Court can be said to have made
a rule retroactive “only where the Court’s holdings logically permit no other
conclusion than that the rule is retroactive.”164 Justice O’Connor also
invoked Teague’s first exception to provide an “easy to demonstrate”
example of the multiple holdings principle: “When the Court holds as a
new rule in a subsequent case that a particular species of primary, private
individual conduct is beyond the power of the criminal lawmaking authority
to proscribe, it necessarily follows that this Court has ‘made’ that new rule
retroactive to cases on collateral review.”165 Since the Tyler decision,
courts have come to follow Justice O’Connor’s approach in determining
whether a rule is made retroactive.166
160. Id. at 664; see also supra note 92 and accompanying text.
161. Tyler, 533 U.S. at 666.
162. Id. at 668 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
163. Id. at 668–69 (citations omitted); see also id. at 672–73 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 669 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
165. Id. When this occurs, Justice O’Connor explained, the Court has made the rule
retroactive “through its holdings alone, without resort to dicta and without any application of
principles by lower courts.” Id. Justice Breyer, for the dissent, agreed. See id. at 675
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
166. See Price v. United States, 795 F.3d 731, 734 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Several courts of
appeals have adopted Justice O’Connor’s Tyler analysis to determine whether a recent
decision by the Supreme Court satisfies the standards for authorization under
§ 2255(h)(2).”); Nishi Kumar, Cruel, Unusual, and Completely Backwards: An Argument
for Retroactive Application of the Eighth Amendment, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1331, 1367 (2015)
(“[A]lthough AEDPA seems to explicitly require that the Supreme Court make a rule
retroactive . . . this requirement has not been consistently applied by the lower courts. The
more common practice is for lower courts to discern whether the Supreme Court would have
found a decision to be retroactive and deny or grant a petition on that basis.”); Vladeck,
supra note 37, at 4 (“[A]fter Tyler, lower courts have generally agreed that, if a new rule is
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4. Criticisms of Tyler
The Tyler decision has been criticized on several grounds, including its
effect on Congress’s intent in promulgating AEDPA and its highly
preclusive effect on successive habeas petitions.167 AEDPA’s legislative
history suggests that Congress indeed intended to make it harder for
successive petitions to be reviewed, but query whether Congress intended
the Tyler majority’s exacting interpretation of the statute.168 Also unclear is
whether Congress intended the slight difference in the syntax of
§ 2255(f)(3) and § 2255(h)(2) to have such a substantial impact on the way
retroactivity is assessed for first as opposed to successive § 2255
motions.169 Further complicating matters is the general understanding that,
on some level, AEDPA was “intended to incorporate, in wholesale fashion,
the Court’s retroactivity jurisprudence.”170 But under the Court’s prior
retroactivity jurisprudence, successive petitions based on new rules of
constitutional law were not nearly as burdensome a showing to make.171
Even taking Tyler at face value, it is unclear when the Court has “held” a
rule to be retroactive, and the Tyler majority’s holding and Justice
unambiguously retroactive based upon prior Supreme Court precedents (say, for example,
because it is clearly ‘substantive’ under Teague), then there need not be a subsequent
Supreme Court decision in which the new rule is ‘made retroactive’; it was already ‘made
retroactive’ by dint of the prior holdings that all ‘substantive’ new rules are retroactively
enforceable.”).
167. See infra notes 169, 176, 178–79, 181–82 and accompanying text.
168. See supra text accompanying notes 87, 90, 152–53; see also H.R. REP. No. 104-518,
at 111 (1996) (“This title incorporates reforms to curb the abuse of . . . habeas
corpus . . . . Successive petitions must be approved by a panel of the court of appeals and are
limited to those petitions that . . . involve new constitutional rights that have been
retroactively applied by the Supreme Court.”). Congress was also concerned with
preventing “successive bites at the apple,” that is, multiple habeas petitions by the same
petitioner. See, e.g., 141 Cong. Rec. 14,734 (1995) (statement of Sen. Feinstein) (“[T]his bill
provides habeas petitioners with one bite of the apple. It assures that no one convicted of a
capital crime will be barred from seeking habeas relief in Federal court . . . [and] it
appropriately limits second and subsequent habeas appeals to narrow and appropriate
circumstances.”); 137 Cong. Rec. 16,538 (1991) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (recognizing a
problem when prisoners take “a 10th bite of the apple, even a 20th bite of the apple”).
169. See Stevenson, supra note 44, at 772–73 (“Congress intended to ensure that
petitioners would have at least one full, fair opportunity to raise each meritorious
claim . . . . [But] those who voted for the legislation surely did not anticipate or intend the
severe ripple effects that the preclusive successive petition rules have had . . . .”); see also id.
at 771 (arguing that Congress likely did not intend to constrict successive federal habeas
corpus in a way that prejudices meritorious claims that can only be litigated on successive
collateral review). Indeed, AEDPA was hastily drafted after the Oklahoma City bombing
and has not “been hailed as an epitome of sophisticated statutory drafting.” Angela Ellis, “Is
Innocence Irrelevant” to AEDPA’s Statute of Limitations? Avoiding a Miscarriage of
Justice in Federal Habeas Corpus, 56 VILL. L. REV. 129, 148 (2011); see Lindh v. Murphy,
521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997) (“[I]n a world of silk purses and pigs’ ears, the Act is not a silk
purse of the art of statutory drafting.”). It is therefore not unfathomable that the hasty
creation of the act unintentionally led to the Tyler holding.
170. Zarrow & Milliken, supra note 95, at 981; see also supra note 151 and
accompanying text.
171. See Stevenson, supra note 44, at 710–11 (“The substantive standard that this
‘gatekeeping panel’ is to apply . . . is far more restrictive and unforgiving than its
antecedent.”).
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O’Connor’s multiple holdings approach are in tension. On the one hand,
the Court has stated that only the Court itself can make a rule retroactive
under § 2244(b)(2)(A) through an express holding to that effect.172 On the
other hand, the majority suggested, and both Justice O’Connor and the
dissent agreed, that multiple holdings can logically dictate the Court has
held a new rule retroactive.173 Finally, Justice O’Connor’s easy example—
that a rule is made retroactive when it is a type contemplated by Teague’s
first exception—only further obfuscates the inquiry.174
Although there is a dearth of scholarship on Tyler, the existing scholarly
reactions to the decision are largely critical of its narrow interpretation of
§ 2244(b)(2)(A).175 Some have argued that Tyler erodes the established
retroactivity approach and renders Teague an obsolete doctrine in the
successive habeas context.176 While the Court maintains that Teague is still
its own standard under AEDPA,177 by creating an inquiry that requires both
examining whether the Supreme Court has expressly held a new rule
retroactive and performing a Teague retroactivity analysis, Tyler has
reduced the significance of the Teague analysis. The Tyler decision also
arguably impedes the traditional notions of the purpose of habeas corpus178
and unreasonably limits lower federal courts’ jurisdiction over habeas
petitions.179 In addition, some argue that Tyler’s virtual elimination of the
availability of successive habeas petitions is a violation of the Suspension
Clause.180 Indeed, Tyler may result in situations where a petitioner is never
able to bring a successive claim based on a new ruling that would otherwise
be classified as retroactive under Teague, because for all practical purposes
the Supreme Court is unlikely to expressly hold a new rule retroactive when
announcing the rule.181 Finally, Tyler leads to inequitable results for
172. See Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 663–64 (2001).
173. See id. at 666; id. at 668–69 (O’Connor, J., concurring); id. at 672–73 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
174. See id. at 669 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
175. See sources cited infra notes 176, 178, 181, 182.
176. See, e.g., Gehring, supra note 96, at 210 (“[T]he Court’s decision in Tyler effectively
eliminates the two exceptions found in Teague v. Lane, which in turn makes . . . Teague
obsolete.”).
177. See generally Horn v. Banks, 536 U.S. 266 (2002).
178. Because the Tyler reading of § 2255(h)(2) “forecloses meritorious [habeas] claims,”
Litman, supra note 29, at 52, it prevents habeas review for prisoners who have been
“incarcerated under a procedure which creates an impermissibly large risk that the innocent
will be convicted,” Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 262 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting);
see also supra notes 77, 134 and accompanying text.
179. See Peter J. Smith, Textualism and Jurisdiction, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1883, 1914–15
(2008) (discussing how the Supreme Court has used textualism to narrow courts’ jurisdiction
in a variety of ways, and stating that Tyler limited federal courts’ ability to entertain habeas
petitions).
180. See Allen, supra note 103, at 127 n.114; Gehring, supra note 96, at 211; see also
U.S. CONST. art. I., § 9, cl. 2.
181. See Tyler, 533 U.S. at 677 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“After today’s opinion . . . [w]e
will be required to restate the obvious, case by case, even when we have explicitly said, but
not ‘held,’ that a new rule is retroactive.”); see also Doherty, supra note 101, at 481 & n.196
(suggesting that, after Tyler, to avoid the waste and delay in waiting for a new rule to be held
retroactive, the Court should describe the retroactivity of a new rule when announced, but
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similarly situated habeas petitioners.182 The current circuit split on Johnson
retroactivity exemplifies this inequity.
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT ON JOHNSON RETROACTIVITY
Before Johnson, inmates petitioning for habeas relief founded on
erroneous applications of the residual clause generally relied on a line of
cases that began with Begay v. United States.183 The ruling in Johnson,
however, has supplanted those cases as the basis for habeas relief from
sentences imposed under the residual clause.184 Inmates sentenced under
the residual clause now have a new, and certainly more salient, argument
for relief—they were deprived of due process of law.
The circuit split on whether the new rule announced in Johnson can be
used in successive petitions under § 2255 and overcome the § 2255(h)(2)
approval requirement185 serves as a major impediment to petitioners in
certain jurisdictions.186 As of the writing of this Note, the First, Second,
Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have authorized successive
habeas petitions and found that Johnson has been made retroactive by the
Supreme Court under § 2255(h)(2) and Tyler.187 On the other hand, the
also recognizing that such a scenario is unlikely); Strauss, supra note 112, at 1247 (“The
Supreme Court’s Tyler decision simply forecloses the possibility that a second or successive
§ 2255 motion will be entertained without a Supreme Court holding of retroactivity.”);
Amanda L. Tyler, Continuity, Coherence, and the Canons, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1389, 1444
n.260 (2005) (“[T]he Court would have no reason when establishing a new constitutional
rule in a direct appeal to speak to the applicability of the new rule to collateral cases.”).
182. See Strauss, supra note 112, at 1247–48 (“[After Tyler] even the Teague bright-line
definition of ‘similarly situated,’ meaning all litigants in the same procedural posture, does
not operate evenly.”). Still, maintaining some restrictions on successive habeas motions
does secure finality interests. See, e.g., Gilbert v. United States, 640 F.3d 1293, 1311 (11th
Cir. 2011) (“The statutory bar against second or successive motions is one of the most
important AEDPA safeguards for finality of judgment. . . . If second and successive motions
are not ‘greatly restrict[ed],’ there will be no end to collateral attacks on convictions and
sentences, and there will be no finality of judgment.” (alterations in original)).
183. 553 U.S. 137 (2008); see, e.g., Spencer v. United States, 773 F.3d 1132 (11th Cir.
2014) (applying Begay but denying relief for lack of cognizability); Sun Bear v. United
States, 644 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2011) (same); Narvaez v. United States, 674 F.3d 621 (7th Cir.
2011) (applying Begay and Chambers v. United States retroactively); see also Runyon, supra
note 36, at 448 (discussing the pre-Johnson Supreme Court cases that construed the residual
clause).
184. See Price v. United States, 795 F.3d 731, 732 (7th Cir. 2015) (recognizing Johnson
as overruling Begay).
185. See supra text accompanying note 90.
186. To be clear, the split is on whether Johnson has been “made retroactive” and not on
whether Johnson is retroactive under Teague or whether it announced a new constitutional
rule. In fact, at least one circuit that has held that Johnson has not been made retroactive
recognizes that Johnson is substantive and thus likely retroactive under Teague. See In re
Rivero, 797 F.3d 986, 989 (11th Cir. 2015).
187. See, e.g., Pakala v. United States, 804 F.3d 139, 140 (1st Cir. 2015) (per curiam);
Rivera v. United States, No. 13-4654 (2d Cir. Oct. 5, 2015); In re Watkins, No. 15-5038,
2015 WL 9241176, at *1 (6th Cir. Dec. 17, 2015); Price, 795 F.3d at 734–35; Woods v.
United States, 805 F.3d 1152, 1154 (8th Cir. 2015) (per curiam); Striet v. United States, No.
15-72506 (9th Cir. Aug. 25, 2015). Moreover, the U.S. Department of Justice regularly
concedes that Johnson is retroactive for both initial and successive § 2255 motions. See
Letter, In re Jackson, No. 15-8098 (10th Cir. Oct. 20, 2015) (urging the court to reconsider
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Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have denied authorizations on the
ground that Johnson has not been made retroactive by the Supreme
Court.188 Accordingly, Part II.A examines select decisions from several of
the circuits that have held that Johnson has been made retroactive, and Part
II.B examines select decisions from the circuits that have found that
Johnson has not been made retroactive.189
A. The Majority View: The Supreme Court Has Made
Johnson Retroactive to Cases on Collateral Review
Although the Seventh, Sixth, First, and Eighth Circuits agree that
Johnson has been made retroactive, they are not in complete agreement as
to why. Part II.A.1 details Seventh and Sixth Circuit opinions holding that
Johnson has been made retroactive. Part II.A.2 highlights First and Eighth
Circuit opinions granting authorization to file successive § 2255 motions
based primarily on the Government’s concession that Johnson has been
made retroactive.
1. The Seventh and Sixth Circuits:
Johnson Was Made Retroactive Under Tyler
The Seventh Circuit was the first federal appellate court to rule on
whether Johnson can be applied retroactively to a successive § 2255
motion. In Price v. United States,190 Price was convicted in 2006 of being a
felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).191 Price
had three prior convictions that qualified him for the ACCA’s sentencing
enhancement,192 and the court sentenced him to twenty years and ten
months imprisonment,193 a term exceeding the fifteen-year mandatory
minimum sentence under the ACCA.194 Price’s sentence was affirmed on
direct appeal and his subsequent § 2255 motion was denied.195
After the Supreme Court decided Johnson, Price petitioned the Seventh
Circuit to authorize the district court to entertain a successive § 2255
its holding in In re Gieswein, and indicating that the Government believes that Johnson has
been made retroactive); Litman, supra note 40, at 82.
188. See, e.g., In re Williams, 806 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 2015); In re Gieswein, 802
F.3d 1143, 1148–49 (10th Cir. 2015) (per curiam); Rivero, 797 F.3d at 989. As of this
writing, only Williams holds that Johnson is not retroactive under Teague. Although
scholars believe Johnson is retroactive under Teague, they are not in agreement that it has
been made retroactive. See, e.g., Litman, supra note 29, at 48–49 (arguing that Johnson is
retroactive under Teague but conceding uncertainty on whether it has been made
retroactive); Vladeck, supra note 37 (arguing the Court should make Johnson retroactive but
not weighing in on whether it has already done so).
189. The cases this part discusses were selected because they were either the first cases in
their circuits to encounter the issue or were the first to provide substantive analysis beyond
that of a summary order granting or denying authorization.
190. 795 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2015).
191. Id. at 732.
192. See id.; 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2012).
193. See Price, 795 F.3d at 732.
194. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).
195. See Price, 795 F.3d at 732.
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motion196 on the basis that his prior sentence, invoked under the
unconstitutional residual clause, was unlawful.197 In determining whether
to authorize Price’s successive motion, the court first engaged in a Teague
analysis and established that the Johnson rule was one of constitutional law
because it “rests on the notice requirement of the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment” to the Constitution.198 The court next found that the
rule was a new rule, because it was not dictated by prior precedent nor
previously available to Price.199 The court then determined that Johnson
was also a substantive rule, because in striking down the residual clause, the
Court prohibited a “certain category of punishment for a class of defendants
because of their status.”200 The court held that a prisoner sentenced under
the residual clause thus bears substantial risk of receiving “a punishment
that the law cannot impose upon him.”201
In finally determining that Johnson was “made retroactive to cases on
collateral review by the Supreme Court,”202 the court reasoned that the
Supreme Court need not expressly hold Johnson retroactive.203 The court
relied on Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Tyler,204 which stated that the
Court can make a rule retroactive “through multiple holdings that logically
dictate the retroactivity of the new rule.”205 As such, and because Justice
O’Connor in Tyler explained that when the Court creates a new rule
protecting a particular class of primary conduct from the criminal
lawmaking authority’s power to proscribe,206 the Price court recognized
that “it necessarily follows that [the Supreme Court] has ‘made’” the new
substantive Johnson rule retroactive.207 The Price court, in essence, used
the Bousley and Summerlin expansions of Teague’s first exception208 to
characterize Johnson as substantive and as one of the easy cases that Justice
O’Connor has said the Court has necessarily made retroactive. In sum,
because of the substantive nature of the Johnson rule, the court reasoned
that the Supreme Court had made Johnson retroactive.209
196. See id.; supra notes 90–93 and accompanying text.
197. See Price, 795 F.3d at 732.
198. Id.
199. See id. at 732–33.
200. Id. at 734 (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 494 (1990)). Saffle derived this
language from Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989). See supra Part I.D.2.
201. Price, 795 F.3d at 734 (quoting Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352 (2004)).
Summerlin, in turn, was quoting United States v. Davis, 417 U.S. 333 (1974)—via Bousley v.
United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998)—to invoke a traditional purpose of habeas corpus.
See Summerlin, 542 U.S. at 352; see also supra note 134 and accompanying text. See
generally supra Part I.D.2.
202. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2) (2012); see Price, 795 F.3d at 734.
203. See Price, 795 F.3d at 734.
204. Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656 (2001).
205. Price, 795 F.3d at 733 (quoting Tyler, 533 U.S. at 668 (O’Connor, J., concurring));
see also supra notes 163–65 and accompanying text.
206. See Price, 795 F.3d at 733 (quoting Tyler, 533 U.S. at 669 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring)).
207. Id. at 734 (quoting Tyler, 533 U.S. at 669 (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
208. See supra Part I.D.2.
209. See Price, 795 F.3d at 734.
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The Sixth Circuit, in In re Watkins,210 took a similar approach. Like the
other circuits to consider the issue, the court first asserted that Johnson
announced a new rule of constitutional law that was previously unavailable
The court then invoked Justice O’Connor’s
to the petitioner.211
concurrence in Tyler and determined that the Johnson rule fell within the
easy to demonstrate logical relationships that Justice O’Connor
articulated.212 Accordingly, the court held that because Johnson disallows
“the imposition of an increased sentence on those defendants whose status
as armed career criminals is dependent on offenses that fall within the
residual clause . . . ‘[t]here is no escaping the logical conclusion that the
[Supreme] Court itself has made Johnson categorically retroactive to cases
on collateral review.’”213
2. The First and Eighth Circuits:
Accepting the Government’s Concession of Retroactivity
Like the Seventh Circuit, the First Circuit in Pakala v. United States214
authorized a petitioner’s request to file a successive § 2255 motion based on
Johnson.215 In Pakala, the Government conceded that the petitioner “ha[d]
at least made a prima facie showing that Johnson ha[d] been made
retroactive by the Supreme Court.”216 In light of this concession, the court
authorized the motion, but noted that the Johnson retroactivity question has
divided the circuit courts.217
The Eighth Circuit has also authorized a petitioner’s request to file a
successive § 2255 motion alleging Johnson error.218 In Woods v. United
States,219 the court granted deference to the Government’s position that
Johnson has been made retroactive: “Here, the United States concedes that
Johnson is retroactive, and it joins Woods’s motion. Based on the
[G]overnment’s concession, we conclude that Woods has made a prima
facie showing” that Johnson has been made retroactive.220 In a subsequent
case, however, the Eighth Circuit again granted authorization to a petitioner
but qualified its position on Johnson retroactivity: “The district court—
unencumbered by the ‘stringent time limit’ that applies to the court of
appeals—should [consider] the views of the other circuit courts.”221 In
210. No. 15-5038, 2015 WL 9241176 (6th Cir. Dec. 17, 2015).
211. See id. at *3.
212. See id. at *5; see also supra note 165 and accompanying text.
213. See Watkins, 2015 WL 9241176, at *6 (quoting Price, 795 F.3d at 734); supra notes
105–09 and accompanying text.
214. 804 F.3d 139 (1st Cir. 2015) (per curiam).
215. See id. at 140.
216. Id. at 139.
217. See id. at 139 n.1.
218. Woods v. United States, 805 F.3d 1152, 1154 (8th Cir. 2015) (per curiam).
219. 805 F.3d 1152 (8th Cir. 2015) (per curiam).
220. Id.
221. Menteer v. United States, 806 F.3d 1156, 1156–57 (8th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted)
(quoting Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 664 (2001)). While the First and Eighth Circuits
accepted the Government’s concession that Johnson was made retroactive, it is unclear
whether courts can in fact accept such a concession. See Litman, supra note 27. If the
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effect, the Eighth Circuit, although finding that on a prima facie level
Johnson has been made retroactive, left open the possibility that on remand
the district court might disagree.
B. The Minority View: The Supreme Court Has Not Made
Johnson Retroactive to Cases on Collateral Review
In contrast to the aforementioned circuits, the Eleventh and Tenth
Circuits have held that Johnson has not been made retroactive, and the Fifth
Circuit has gone so far as to suggest that Johnson is not retroactive under
Teague.222 Part II.B.1 begins with the Eleventh Circuit’s viewpoint that no
series of holdings dictate that Johnson has been made retroactive, and Part
II.B.2 addresses the Tenth Circuit’s textualist reasoning that led to its
determination that Johnson has not been made retroactive. Finally, Part
II.B.3 details the Fifth Circuit’s outlier opinion.
1. The Eleventh Circuit: Johnson Has Not Been Made
Retroactive Under Tyler
In In re Rivero,223 the petitioner was found guilty of being a felon in
possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).224 In 2015,
following the ruling in Johnson, Rivero filed an application with the
Eleventh Circuit seeking an order permitting the district court to entertain a
successive motion under § 2255.225
The court began by conceding that Johnson announced a new substantive
constitutional rule, because it “narrow[ed] the scope of [§] 924(e) by
interpreting its terms, specifically, the term violent felony.”226 The court
recognized, however, that under Tyler only the Supreme Court can make a
new rule retroactive and that when it does so, “it does so unequivocally, in
gatekeeping requirements are jurisdictional, and some courts have held that they are, a court
must decide for itself if the rule has been made retroactive. See id.
222. This is the minority view even among the circuit courts denying authorizations. See
Litman, supra note 27.
223. 797 F.3d 986 (11th Cir. 2015). As of this writing, the Rivero court has sua sponte
appointed counsel for the petitioner and ordered briefing on the Johnson retroactivity
question. See Order at 1–2, In re Rivero, No. 15-13089 (11th Cir. Sept. 14, 2015). This
section, however, only considers the opinion denying authorization for failing to make a
prima facie showing that Johnson has been made retroactive. Because the dissenting opinion
provides exceptional insight into the argument that Johnson has been made retroactive, this
section discusses the dissent’s counter arguments to the majority’s points in corresponding
footnotes.
224. See United States v. Rivero, 141 F. App’x 800, 800–01 (11th Cir. 2005) (per
curiam).
225. See Rivero, 797 F.3d at 988. Notably, Rivero’s original sentence was based on the
United States Sentencing Guidelines’ career offender residual clause—which uses identical
language as the ACCA’s residual clause—and not the ACCA. See id. at 988. Although this
might be viewed as a distinction from the other Johnson-based petitions, the Eleventh Circuit
has subsequently denied a Johnson claim from a prisoner sentenced under the ACCA,
solidifying its view that Johnson has not been made retroactive. See In re Franks, No. 1515456-G, 2016 WL 80551, at *4 (11th Cir. Jan. 6, 2016).
226. Rivero, 797 F.3d at 989 (alterations in original) (quoting Bryant v. Warden, FCC
Coleman-Medium, 738 F.3d 1253, 1278 (11th Cir. 2013)).
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the form of a holding.”227 Although the court recognized, like the Price
court, that a rule could be made retroactive through multiple holdings that
logically dictate the rule’s retroactivity,228 the court nevertheless found that
no combination of holdings necessarily dictated that Johnson was made
retroactive.229
The court also suggested that there are only “two types of new
substantive rules of constitutional law” that the Supreme Court has
“necessarily dictated” apply retroactively on collateral review: new rules
that prohibit the punishment of certain primary conduct, which place
specific conduct or persons covered by a statute beyond the state’s power to
punish,230 and new rules that prohibit “a category of punishment for certain
offenders or offenses.”231 The court subsequently reasoned that the
Johnson rule neither prohibits Congress from punishing a criminal who has
a prior conviction for attempted burglary nor prohibits Congress from
increasing that criminal’s sentence because of his prior conviction.232 In
short, the Rivero court did not find that Johnson prevents a defendant from
facing a punishment that the law cannot impose upon him.233
The majority responded to the dissent’s argument—that Bousley logically
dictates that Johnson was made retroactive—by asserting that in Bousley
the Court did not apply a new constitutional rule; rather, it applied a new
rule that narrowed the scope of a criminal statute by interpreting its
227. Id. (quoting In re Anderson, 396 F.3d 1336, 1339 (11th Cir. 2005)).
228. See id.; see also In re Gieswein, 802 F.3d 1143, 1148 (10th Cir. 2015) (per curiam)
(recognizing that “[t]he Eleventh Circuit followed a similar path [as Price] in Rivero”).
229. See Rivero, 797 F.3d at 989. The Rivero court also explicitly referenced Price: “We
acknowledge that one of our sister circuits has held that Johnson applies retroactively . . . but
we are unpersuaded by that decision.” Id. at 990.
230. See id. (citing Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351 (2004)).
231. Id. The Rivero court listed, as an example of this type of rule, the rule from Atkins v.
Virginia. See id. The Rivero court presumably derived the “category of punishment”
language from Penry. See supra Part I.D.2. The majority further asserted that the retroactive
application of new substantive rules to cases on collateral review is “limit[ed] . . . to those
rules that ‘necessarily carry a significant risk that a defendant stands convicted of an act that
the law does not make criminal or faces a punishment that the law cannot impose upon
him.’” Rivero, 797 F.3d at 988 (quoting Summerlin, 542 U.S. at 352). Judge Pryor in dissent
argued that the majority eschewed Bousley, which held that decisions that narrow the scope
of a statute by interpreting its terms are examples of precisely such a substantive rule. See id.
at 996 (Pryor, J., dissenting).
232. See Rivero, 797 F.3d at 990. The court stated that if Congress wished to impose
lengthier sentences based on prior convictions, like those of Rivero, it could do so under a
clear statute. See id. at 989. The dissent responded by asserting that “[r]eliance upon what
Congress could do to salvage what the Supreme Court has declared unconstitutional is
without legal foundation.” See id. at 999 (Pryor, J., dissenting).
233. See id. at 991 (majority opinion). The dissent counter argued that Johnson has been
made retroactive because the rule it established both narrows the scope of a criminal statute
and places conduct or persons covered by the statute beyond the State’s authority to punish.
See id. at 997 (Pryor, J., dissenting). The dissent specifically relied on the multiple holdings
approach outlined in Justice O’Connor’s Tyler concurrence, arguing that in Bousley the
Court held that rules limiting the reach of a federal criminal statute are not barred by Teague
nonretroactivity and that Johnson is the same type of case as Bousley because it too
narrowed the scope of a criminal statute by interpreting its terms. See id. at 997–98. She
thus concluded that Bousley and Johnson taken together necessarily dictate Johnson’s
retroactivity. See id. at 998.
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terms.234 It reasoned that, per Summerlin, examples of new substantive
rules include “‘decisions that narrow that scope of [a statute’s] terms’ and
‘constitutional determinations that place particular conduct or persons
covered by the statute beyond the State’s power to punish.’”235 Therefore,
the court held, the Bousley holding cannot necessarily dictate that Johnson
(which announced a new constitutional rule) was made retroactive because
Bousley did not rely on a new rule of constitutional law,236 and
§ 2255(h)(2) allows successive motions based only on new rules of
constitutional law.237 The majority also asserted that the dissent’s approach
was markedly different from the Seventh Circuit’s approach, as Price
surmised Johnson’s retroactivity because the rule prohibited a certain
category of punishment for a class of defendants and not specifically that
Bousley dictated Johnson’s retroactivity.238
2. The Tenth Circuit: The Supreme Court Has Not Made Johnson
Retroactive Because It Has Yet to Expressly Hold It Retroactive
Like the Eleventh Circuit, the Tenth Circuit, in In re Gieswein,239
declined to hold that Johnson was made retroactive by the Supreme
Court.240 The Gieswein court, however, employed a different approach
than that of the Rivero court.241 Instead of initially surveying retroactivity
case law and determining that no series of holdings logically dictates that
Johnson has been made retroactive, the Gieswein court relied chiefly on the
Tyler majority’s overarching principle—that “the Supreme Court is the only
234. See id. at 992 (majority opinion).
235. See id. at 991 (quoting Summerlin, 542 U.S. at 351–52). The court implied both
criteria must be met for a rule to be substantive. See id. at 991. But see id. at 997 (Pryor, J.,
dissenting) (“Summerlin could not be clearer that a rule is retroactive if it falls into one of the
two related categories the Supreme Court described. So requiring a new rule to check the
boxes of both types of substantive, retroactive decisions—when the two types are listed
disjunctively—is directly contrary to Summerlin.”).
236. See id. at 992 (majority opinion).
237. The dissent responded that Johnson is “precisely the kind of rule” the Court has held
applies retroactively, as it “‘necessarily carr[ies] a significant risk that a defendant’ . . . faces
a punishment that the law cannot impose upon him.” Id. at 998 (Pryor, J., dissenting)
(alteration in original) (quoting Summerlin, 542 U.S. at 352). The dissent noted that
Summerlin does not require the new rule to both narrow the scope of a statute and place
conduct beyond the state’s power to punish—rather these are distinct ways a rule can be
substantive and retroactive. See id. at 997–98. The dissent continued that although Bousley
did not announce a new constitutional rule, it is not precluded from dictating Johnson’s
retroactivity. See id. at 998 n.7. The dissent asserted that retroactivity is logically dictated
when the Supreme Court holds in one case that a particular type of rule applies retroactively
and in a subsequent case that a given rule is of that type. See id. Tyler, the dissent argued,
does not require that Case One hold that a particular type of constitutional rule applies
retroactively because “[t]hat would conflate the elements of a successive motion that the
Tyler majority made clear were distinct.” Id.
238. See id. at 992 (majority opinion). Conversely, the dissent asserted that “[t]o the
extent there is any discrepancy [between the Rivero dissent and Price], it is only a matter of
emphasis.” Id. at 999 n.8 (Pryor, J., dissenting).
239. 802 F.3d 1143 (10th Cir. 2015) (per curiam).
240. See id. at 1148–49.
241. See id. at 1148.
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entity that can ‘make’ a new rule retroactive” and only through a “holding
to that effect.”242 The court reasoned that its “inquiry is statutorily limited
to whether the Supreme Court has made the new rule retroactive to cases on
collateral review.”243 The court found it could not apply Johnson
retroactively simply because the Supreme Court has not held that the new
rule in Johnson is retroactive.244 Although the Gieswein court then
acknowledged the multiple holdings approach, the court rejected the
petitioner’s argument that the Supreme Court had made the rule in Johnson
retroactive because it found that no series of holdings necessarily dictate
that Johnson was made retroactive.245 The court reiterated that it cannot
“do more than simply rely on Supreme Court holdings on retroactivity.”246
Without a holding on Johnson retroactivity specifically, the court declined
to grant the petitioner authorization to file a successive § 2255 motion.247
3. The Fifth Circuit: Johnson Is Not Substantive
and Therefore Not Retroactive
Like the Eleventh and Tenth Circuits, the Fifth Circuit, in In re
Williams,248 declined to grant a petitioner’s request to file a successive
§ 2255 motion.249 Unlike its sister circuits, however, the Fifth Circuit did
not analyze the petitioner’s claim under Tyler, but rather suggested that
Johnson was not retroactive under Teague.250 The court began by stating
that Johnson announced a new rule of constitutional law.251 But the court
then asserted that Johnson does not fall within Teague’s watershed rule
exception nor is it substantive.252 The court concluded that Johnson does
not forbid a certain category of punishment because, after Johnson,

242. See id. at 1146 (quoting Cannon v. Mullin, 297 F.3d 989, 993 (10th Cir. 2002)).
243. See id.
244. See id. at 1147. Ergo, the court asserted, “[T]he mere fact a new rule might fall
within the general parameters of overarching retroactivity principles established by the
Supreme Court (i.e., Teague) is not sufficient.” Id. at 1146.
245. Id. at 1147. Although they reached different conclusions, both the Price and Rivero
courts emphasized the multiple holdings approach and examined whether certain holdings
dictated that Johnson was made retroactive. In sidestepping the multiple holdings method,
the Gieswein court emphasized “the difficult legal analysis that can be required to determine
questions of retroactivity in the first instance” and opted to adhere to Tyler and a plain
reading of AEDPA. Id.
246. Id. at 1148.
247. See id. at 1149. The court also declined “to adopt the Seventh Circuit’s approach in
Price” because Price “did what we have said we cannot do: it made its ‘own determination
that a new rule fits within [a] Teague exception [to nonretroactivity].’” Id. at 1148
(alterations in original) (quoting Cannon, 297 F.3d at 994).
248. 806 F.3d 322 (5th Cir. 2015).
249. See id. at 326.
250. See id. at 325–26. Indeed, after Williams, a petitioner’s first § 2255 motion alleging
Johnson error was denied. See Harrimon v. United States, No. 15-CV-00152 (N.D. Tex.
Nov. 19, 2015), petition for cert. filed, No. 15-7426 (Dec. 11, 2015). These cases, however,
represent the ultra minority view. See Litman, supra note 27.
251. See Williams, 806 F.3d at 325 (“Joining the four other circuits that have decided this
issue, we hold that Johnson announced a new rule of constitutional law.”).
252. See id. at 325–26.
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individuals may still be sentenced to fifteen years in prison for possession
of a firearm, albeit not under a vague statute.253
The court then discussed Bousley, but instead of examining it in the
context of the Teague exceptions, it proceeded to rebut the Rivero dissent’s
argument that Bousley logically dictates Johnson retroactivity.254 The court
asserted that Bousley does not control the Johnson retroactivity inquiry
because the rule announced in Bousley emerged from the Court’s
interpretation of a statute—which is substantive and not subject to
Teague—while Johnson resulted in the complete invalidation of a statute—
which the Williams court likened to a new procedural rule.255
In sum, with the exception of the Williams decision, the cases discussed
in this part reveal that the courts of appeals are largely in agreement that
Johnson announced a new substantive constitutional rule that is retroactive
under Teague and should be applied to initial collateral challenges. They
are split, though, over whether Johnson has been made retroactive by the
Supreme Court so as to permit its utilization on successive collateral
challenges. With the circuit split explored, this Note next puts forth a
solution to the split and to the overall approach to retroactivity for
successive collateral challenges.
III. A PROPOSED RESOLUTION TO THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
AND THE TYLER APPROACH
With the current circuit split resulting in the disparate treatment of
similarly situated prisoners, a Supreme Court decision on Johnson
retroactivity—which will hopefully materialize in Welch v. United States256
this Term—would bring welcome clarification to the circuits’ conflicting
viewpoints. But while a Supreme Court holding adopting the majority view
and stating that Johnson is retroactive under Teague would reconcile the
circuit split,257 this part proposes that the Supreme Court explicitly hold that
Johnson has been made retroactive. By finding that Johnson has been
made retroactive under Justice O’Connor’s multiple holdings principle—
specifically that Bousley dictates that Johnson was made retroactive258—the
Court would still allow for those prisoners sentenced above the statutory
maximum under the unconstitutional residual clause to seek relief
uniformly.
Indeed, while such a holding would facilitate relief for those with
meritorious Johnson claims otherwise foreclosed by an overly strict
interpretation of Tyler and § 2255(h)(2), it would also be an important first
253. See id. The Rivero court also made this assertion, see In re Rivero, 797 F.3d 986,
990–91 (11th Cir. 2015), although unlike Williams, it found Johnson to be substantive, see
id. at 989.
254. See Williams, 806 F.3d at 326. In fact, the Williams court never explicitly mentioned
Tyler.
255. See id.
256. 136 S. Ct. 790 (2016) (granting petition for certiorari).
257. See supra notes 38–40 and accompanying text.
258. Cf. supra notes 233, 237 (describing the Rivero dissent’s argument that Bousley
logically dictates that Johnson was made retroactive). See generally supra Part I.D.2.
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step in recalibrating the overall approach to assessing retroactivity for
successive habeas petitions. If the Court were to then take an additional
step and find that Johnson falls within the easy example articulated by
Justice O’Connor in her Tyler concurrence, the Court would effectively
reframe its whole approach to retroactivity for successive habeas petitions
and abrogate the problem-ridden Tyler majority method.259
By emphasizing Justice O’Connor’s easy example of when a rule has
logically been made retroactive as the standard by which a court determines
whether a rule is made retroactive under AEDPA, the Court would establish
that when it announces a new substantive rule in accordance with the
Teague doctrine—like the rule in Johnson—the Court has simultaneously
made the rule retroactive. Such an approach would effectively cause the
Tyler majority’s method to collapse back into its Teague origins, rendering
Teague once again the primary, and only, inquiry for assessing retroactivity
for successive collateral challenges.260 In effect, this would place the
“made retroactive” determination in the hands of the lower courts and allow
them to assess retroactivity in accordance with Teague principles and
without waiting for a Supreme Court holding specifically addressing the
new rule’s retroactivity.261 Ultimately, this approach would liberalize a
portion of the overly restrictive successive petition statutes and allow for
easier successive collateral review of meritorious claims based on new
constitutional rules.262
By demonstrating that Bousley logically dictates that Johnson is
substantive and retroactive, Part III.A posits that the Supreme Court has
made Johnson retroactive to cases on collateral review. In doing so, Part
III.A also rebuts the arguments made by the courts that have held that
Johnson has not been made retroactive.263 Part III.B then explains the
additional step the Supreme Court should consider taking in finding that
Johnson was made retroactive, a step that entails a liberal reading of Justice
O’Connor’s easy example of when a new rule is made retroactive. Part
III.B also explains how finding that Johnson was made retroactive under
the easy example would recast the Supreme Court’s retroactivity approach
for successive habeas petitions. Finally, Part III.C examines the policy
benefits that would result were the Court to hold that Johnson has been
made retroactive.

259. See Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 660 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring); supra note
165 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 112, 151, 176 and accompanying text. See generally supra Part
I.D.2.
261. Cf. supra note 181 and accompanying text.
262. See Litman, supra note 29, at 52 (noting the current approach prematurely forecloses
upon otherwise meritorious claims).
263. See supra Part I.B.
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A. The Multiple Holdings Approach
As a preliminary matter, Johnson is retroactive under general
retroactivity doctrine as established by Teague and its progeny.264 First,
Johnson announced a new rule, as it was not dictated by prior precedent nor
The Johnson rule is also one of
was it previously available.265
constitutional law, because it stems from the Court’s determination that the
residual clause violated the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.266
Furthermore, the Johnson rule is exempt from nonretroactivity because it is
substantive per Teague’s first exception.267 As exemplified by Bousley and
restated in Summerlin, Johnson narrows the scope of a criminal statute—on
constitutional grounds—by interpreting its terms, which is necessarily a
substantive rule because failure to apply it carries a significant risk that a
defendant will face “a punishment that the law cannot impose upon him.”268
But has Johnson been made retroactive? While the Court in Tyler
established that the word “made” is equivalent to “held,”269 the majority
stated—and Justice O’Connor’s concurrence and the dissent emphasized—
that a new rule can be been made retroactive through a series of holdings
that logically dictate that result.270 This is precisely the situation at bar. In
Bousley, the Court held that rules limiting the scope of a criminal statute by
narrowing its terms are retroactive.271 In Johnson, the Court narrowed the

264. See Litman, supra note 27; supra note 187 and accompanying text. See generally
supra Parts I.D.2, II.
265. See Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1107 (2013). Indeed, this point is
seemingly uncontested. See supra text accompanying notes 199, 211, 226, 251.
266. See Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2563 (2015); see also supra text
accompanying notes 198, 211, 226, 251.
267. See Litman, supra note 29, at 47; Litman, supra note 27; supra Parts I.D.1, II.
268. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352 (2004); see also supra Part I.D.2; cf.
Montgomery v. Louisiana, No. 14-280, 2016 WL 280758, at *13 (U.S. Jan. 25, 2016)
(holding the rule in Miller retroactive because as a substantive rule, it “set forth categorical
constitutional guarantees that place certain criminal laws and punishments altogether beyond
the State’s power to impose. . . . [W]hen a State enforces a proscription or penalty barred by
the Constitution, the resulting conviction or sentence is, by definition, unlawful”). The
Rivero and Williams courts suggest that the Johnson rule does not mitigate the risk that a
defendant faces a punishment that the law cannot impose because if Congress so chooses, it
can still mandate a sentence of fifteen years—via a clear statute—upon someone convicted
of possession of a firearm with three prior violent felony convictions. See In re Rivero, 797
F.3d 986, 990 (11th Cir. 2015); In re Williams, 806 F.3d 322, 325–26 (5th Cir. 2015). But
what Congress could do through tighter language would not cure prior injustices, and neither
court produced authority for this proposition. See In re Watkins, No. 15-5038, 2015 WL
9241176, at *6 (6th Cir. Dec. 17, 2015). Such rationale also overlooks the Court’s Bousley
decision, where Congress too could have enacted a statute that criminalized mere possession
of a weapon during the course of a felony, but such speculation had no bearing on whether
Bailey was retroactive. See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 619–21 (1998); supra
Part I.D.2; cf. Montgomery, 2016 WL 280758, at *13 (“The fact that life without parole
could be a proportionate sentence for . . . [some] juvenile offender[s] does not mean that all
other children imprisoned under a disproportionate sentence have not suffered the
deprivation of a substantive right.”).
269. Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 663 (2001).
270. See id. at 666; id. at 668–69 (O’Connor, J., concurring); supra Part I.D.3.
271. See Bousley, 523 U.S. at 620.
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scope of a criminal statute.272 Simply stated, under the multiple holdings
framework273 recognized by the Tyler majority, emphasized by the Tyler
dissent, and endorsed by Justice O’Connor’s Tyler concurrence, the Court
has made Johnson retroactive to cases on collateral review.274
B. Justice O’Connor’s Easy Example
In deciding whether Johnson was made retroactive, the Supreme Court
might also consider recasting the entire Tyler approach to § 2255(h)(2). It
could do so by invoking in its analysis the doctrinal underpinnings of
habeas corpus275 in conjunction with Justice O’Connor’s easy example of
when a rule has logically been made retroactive.276 Crucially, the language
272. See Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2563 (2015); Litman, supra note 29,
at 47. The Williams court argued that the distinction between a decision narrowing the terms
of a statute and complete invalidation of a statute is enough to break any chain of logic
between Bousley and Johnson. See Williams, 806 F.3d at 326. But this is merely a
distinction without a difference. See Litman, supra note 29, at 47 (“It is hard to see how a
decision ‘interpreting’ ACCA’s scope would be substantive, but a decision invalidating
ACCA’s residual clause—which also alters ACCA’s scope—would not be.
Both . . . decisions modify the elements of an offense and alter a defendant’s eligibility for a
15-year term of imprisonment.”).
273. While this section emphasizes that Bousley logically dictates that Johnson was made
retroactive, it is also feasible that the Court’s recent Montgomery decision, see supra notes
143–47 and accompanying text, which states that Teague and the Constitution require the
retroactive application of substantive rules, also dictates that the Court has made the
substantive Johnson rule retroactive, see Montgomery, 2016 WL 280758, at *6, *7.
274. Cf. supra notes 233, 237 (describing the Rivero dissent’s argument that Bousley
logically dictates that Johnson was made retroactive). The Rivero and Williams courts’
rejection of this approach is flawed because both courts declined to analyze the Bousley rule
as articulated in Summerlin and to recognize that rules that narrow the scope of a criminal
statute operate retroactively because failure to apply them carries the risk that a defendant
would face a punishment that the law cannot impose upon him. See Schriro v. Summerlin,
542 U.S. 348, 352 (2004); see also supra Parts I.D.2, II. Furthermore, the Rivero court’s
argument that Bousley cannot logically dictate Johnson’s retroactivity, because Bousley did
not announce a new rule of constitutional law, is also misplaced. See In re Rivero, 797 F.3d
986, 992 (11th Cir. 2015). The court understood Summerlin to require that a decision
interpreting a statute also announce a constitutional rule and therefore concluded that
because the Bousley rule is not constitutional, it cannot dictate the retroactivity of the
constitutional Johnson rule. See id. But the Summerlin Court did not hold as such, and the
Tyler court did not suggest that the multiple holdings approach requires all holdings involved
to be constitutional in nature. See generally Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348; Tyler, 533 U.S. 656;
supra note 237. The Gieswein court’s conservative approach—framed by plain meaning
statutory interpretation and a close reading of Tyler—also falls short. See In re Gieswein,
802 F.3d 1143, 1146–49 (10th Cir. 2015). While logical, it disregards the multiple holdings
method that all of the justices in Tyler endorsed to varying degrees of warmth. See supra
Part I.D.3. Finally, the Williams court’s analysis is flawed because Johnson is not a
procedural rule that is barred from retroactive application under Teague—it falls precisely
within the Bousley and Summerlin definitions of substantive rules. See Williams, 806 F.3d at
325–26; supra Part I.D.2; cf. Montgomery, 2016 WL 280758, at *14 (stating that the
argument that Miller announced a procedural rule “conflates a procedural requirement
necessary to implement a substantive guarantee with a rule that ‘regulate[s] only the manner
of determining the defendant’s culpability’” (quoting Summerlin, 542 U.S. at 353 (alteration
in original))).
275. See supra notes 77, 134, 201 and accompanying text.
276. See Tyler, 533 U.S. at 669 (O’Connor, J., concurring); supra note 165 and
accompanying text.
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Justice O’Connor used in her easy example is identical to the language used
by the Court in Teague to describe the first exception,277 which entitles
certain rules to retroactive effect because they “assure that no man has been
incarcerated under a procedure which creates an impermissibly large risk
that the innocent will be convicted.”278 The first exception has since
evolved into the substantive rule exception.279 The Court applies
substantive rules retroactively because failure to do so would denature the
core purposes of habeas corpus.280
Indeed, in Teague and its progeny, the Court has routinely invoked the
common theme of habeas corpus’s purpose when determining the
retroactivity of new rules.281 Accordingly, if one reads Justice O’Connor’s
easy example to stand for the proposition that rules falling within Teague’s
first exception have necessarily been made retroactive,282 and one
simultaneously grafts the Court’s analogy in Bousley upon Justice
O’Connor’s reasoning,283 what survives is the notion that substantive
rules—like those that limit the reach of statutes and the application of
which serve the core functions of habeas corpus284—have also necessarily
been made retroactive. Applying this method to the instant situation, the
substantive rule announced in Johnson is entitled to retroactive effect on
successive collateral challenges because failure to do so would impede
habeas corpus’s remedial purpose.285 In short, if the Court were to establish
that Johnson has been made retroactive under Justice O’Connor’s easy
example, it would set a precedent dictating that new substantive rules have
necessarily been made retroactive.286
277. See Tyler, 533 U.S. at 669.
278. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 312 (1989) (quoting Desist v. United States, 394 U.S.
244, 262 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
279. See supra notes 129–47 and accompanying text.
280. See supra notes 130–36, 141, 142 and accompanying text.
281. See supra notes 130–36, 141, 142 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 165, 174 and accompanying text.
283. See supra notes 130–36 and accompanying text.
284. See supra notes 130–36, 141, 142 and accompanying text.
285. Johnson invalidated a criminal statute on constitutional grounds, thus limiting the
ability of the government to punish certain career offenders erroneously as violent felons and
impose fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentences on these individuals. See Litman, supra
note 29, at 47. This type of error, i.e., sentencing above the statutory maximum and under an
unconstitutional statute, is precisely the type of error that habeas is designed to protect
against. See supra notes 77, 134 and accompanying text. The Price and Watkins courts
employed similar reasoning, concluding that the new rule in Johnson fell squarely within the
first Teague exception and was thus made retroactive. See supra Part II.A.1. The Rivero
dissent also proffered this same argument in describing Johnson as having been made
retroactive. See supra Part II.B.1. Although these courts relied on Justice O’Connor’s easy
to demonstrate example as a basis for the deduction that Johnson has been made retroactive,
no court called specifically for an expansion of the easy example, and both courts invoked
iterations of Penry language in their reasoning. See supra Part II. This Note adheres to a
broader view of Teague—that substantive rules operate retroactively.
286. The Supreme Court’s recent Montgomery decision further supports expanding
Justice O’Connor’s easy example to mean that substantive rules have necessarily been made
retroactive. See Montgomery v. Louisiana, No. 14-280, 2016 WL 280758, at *6, *7 (U.S.
Jan. 25, 2016). Indeed, if, as the Court articulated in Montgomery, the Constitution requires
the retroactive application of substantive rules in state collateral review courts because it is
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The additional functional result of this approach would be that Teague
would once against govern the inquiry for assessing the retroactivity of new
rules for successive collateral challenges. This is so because a court would
need only to determine whether a new rule is substantive under Teague in
deciding whether it qualifies for retroactive effect on successive
challenges.287 In fact, this result is consistent with the Court’s own
retroactivity practice.
From a pragmatic perspective, it would be
counterintuitive for the Court to hold that a substantive rule has not been
made retroactive unless the rule was not retroactive under Teague to begin
with. Consider Tyler: while there the Court found that Cage was not made
retroactive and declined to address the question of whether the rule was
retroactive generally under Teague, it appears that the Court would not have
found Cage retroactive under Teague if presented with the question.288
Perhaps the Court was manifesting the view that if a rule falls within the
Teague exceptions, the Court has made it retroactive, while if a rule does
not fall within the Teague exceptions, the Court has not made it
retroactive.289
C. The Policy Implications of Finding
That Johnson Was Made Retroactive
Finding that Johnson has been made retroactive under the multiple
holdings approach will immediately benefit those with viable Johnson
claims. But finding further that Johnson falls within Justice O’Connor’s
easy example—which the Court can do this Term in Welch—will set a
precedent ensuring that future meritorious claims founded on new
constitutional rules can be afforded due consideration on successive
collateral review without being barred by an overly restrictive interpretation
of § 2255(h)(2).290

unconstitutional to detain individuals for conduct that is beyond the law making authority to
proscribe, it necessarily follows that substantive rules must be given retroactive effect in
federal collateral review courts, regardless of whether a petition is initial or successive. See
Montgomery, 2016 WL 280758, at *7 (“[T]he Constitution requires substantive rules to have
retroactive effect regardless of when a conviction became final.”). Thus, by considering new
substantive rules to be made retroactive, a result the Court could effect by liberally
interpreting Justice O’Connor’s easy example of the multiple holdings principle, the Court
would avoid constitutional issues that might otherwise occur if substantive claims on
successive § 2255 motions are denied under the current regime.
287. See supra Part I.D.2 (discussing the development of the substantive rule exception).
288. See supra note 158.
289. Although perhaps post hoc ergo propter hoc logic, this proposition finds support in
the fact that on another occasion, the Court declined to decide whether a prior rule was made
retroactive. See In re Smith, 526 U.S. 1157 (1999) (denying a petition for an original writ of
habeas corpus). Professor Stephen Vladeck suggests that the Court denied the writ and the
opportunity to decide whether the rule at issue had been made retroactive “perhaps because,
so soon after AEDPA, it hoped that cases presenting such circumstances would be rare (and
perhaps because the ‘new rule’ at issue turned out to not be retroactive).” See Vladeck, supra
note 37, at 8.
290. See supra Part I.D.4 (discussing the drawbacks of the strict Tyler interpretation of
the successive collateral challenge bar).
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Accordingly, the Court should adopt Justice O’Connor’s easy example as
the test for surmounting the retroactivity requirements of § 2255(h)(2),291 to
both reduce disparity among similarly situated individuals and to protect the
core purposes of habeas corpus review292 and § 2255(h)(2).293 Adopting
this approach would limit the impact of the Tyler decision and soften the
strict statutory reading given to § 2255(h)(2).294 It would also reinvigorate
the Teague analysis in the successive habeas context.295 Additionally, such
a method would not result in an unreasonable interpretation of § 2255(h)(2)
because the Court already interprets § 2255(f)(3)’s “made retroactive”
language to mean retroactive in accordance with Teague.296 Finally, this
approach would solve the inefficiency problem of waiting for a Supreme
Court holding on the retroactivity of a new rule, which on a practical level
is neither an expedient nor guaranteed event.297
Proponents of the status quo—those that might maintain a rigid bar on
successive habeas petitions—might not agree that Johnson has been made
retroactive under Tyler and would certainly not call for a broader reading of
Tyler and § 2255(h)(2). Still, while these proponents may cite finality
interests, this Note’s approach does not significantly undermine such
interests; finality concerns are lessened in the sentencing context.298
291. Moreover, Justice O’Connor’s Tyler concurrence is already frequently looked to in
assessing retroactivity for successive collateral challenges. See supra note 166 and
accompanying text.
292. See supra notes 77, 134 and accompanying text.
293. See supra notes 168–71 and accompanying text; see also Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S.
656, 676–77 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that AEDPA’s purpose is to prevent
successive petitions when lower courts determine the existence of new rules and their
retroactive applicability). Justice Breyer thus asserts that the legislation was not intended to
bar the lower courts from applying Teague principles to determine the retroactivity of new
rules announced by the Supreme Court. See id.
294. See supra Part I.D.3–4.
295. Using Justice O’Connor’s Tyler concurrence to collapse Tyler into its Teague
foundations seems appropriate, as Justice O’Connor also authored the Teague plurality. See
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 292 (1989); see also supra note 176 and accompanying text
(discussing the argument that the Tyler majority approach abrogates Teague).
296. See supra notes 150, 151 and accompanying text. While the Court in Tyler looked
to § 2254(d) in determining that “made” meant “held,” see supra note 157 and
accompanying text, abandoning that approach would bring the Court’s approach to
§ 2255(h)(2) in better accord with its approach to § 2255(f)(3), see supra notes 150–51 and
accompanying text (discussing the Court’s approach to retroactivity for initial § 2255
motions). This is not unreasonable, as the language of § 2255(h)(2) is more similar to the
language of § 2255(f)(3) than it is to § 2254(d)(1). See supra notes 87, 90, 157 and
accompanying text. See generally supra Part I.D. The Court could justify this approach by
relying on its power to equitably construe habeas statutes—the Court has previously
equitably construed habeas statutes to afford relief that would otherwise be denied had the
statute been given a strict textualist reading. See, e.g., Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,
483–84 (2000); Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637, 644 (1998); see also Stevenson,
supra note 44, at 776 (“[T]he Court has shown a willingness to construe some AEDPA
provisions narrowly so as to preserve the vitality of the writ.”).
297. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
298. See supra note 117; see also Montgomery v. Louisiana, No. 14-280, 2016 WL
280758, at *11 (U.S. Jan. 25, 2016) (“[T]he retroactive application of substantive rules does
not implicate a State’s weighty interests in . . . finality of convictions and
sentences. . . . This concern [of wasting resources] has no application in the realm of
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Furthermore, should the Court choose to adopt this approach, there would
be little to no floodgate risk.299 The number of petitioners with Johnson
claims is relatively few,300 and petitioners who will inevitably seek to rely
on other new rules as the basis of successive claims301 will still face several
gatekeeping provisions and substantial procedural hurdles.302 Finally,
while expecting the circuit courts to use the Teague analysis to determine
whether a new rule has been made retroactive may appear unrealistic in
light of the thirty-day time limit they are afforded to review such petitions,
the inquiry has always been a prima facie one.303 Determining whether a
rule is prima facie substantive under Teague within thirty days is not overly
burdensome and is thus not an unreasonable expectation.304
CONCLUSION
The circuit split on Johnson retroactivity for successive collateral
challenges is currently resulting in the disparate treatment of similarly
situated individuals. As explained herein, the Johnson rule—which is
substantive because it invalidates a sentencing statute on constitutional
grounds—should be given retroactive effect in all instances so as to
preserve the core functions of habeas review. Through Welch, the Supreme
Court will hopefully resolve the split so that prisoners wrongly sentenced
above the statutory maximum for their offenses can uniformly seek relief.
But while the Supreme Court could resolve the split by holding that
Johnson is retroactive under Teague, it should also consider clarifying the
problematic Tyler majority reading of § 2255(h)(2) by finding further that
Johnson has been made retroactive as described by Justice O’Connor in her
Tyler concurrence. Such a holding would reframe the approach of
retroactivity to successive habeas petitions, resulting in the notion that rules
encompassed by Teague’s first exception, and the application of which
serve the core underpinnings of habeas corpus, have necessarily been made
retroactive. This approach would soften Tyler’s control and allow lower
courts to apply Teague in determining the retroactivity of new rules to
successive motions without waiting for a Supreme Court ruling on the
issue. In conclusion, the method this Note proposes would reduce the
inequitable administration of the law, put an end to a part of the overly
restrictive AEDPA, and give those with otherwise meritorious successive

substantive rules, for no resources marshaled by a State could preserve a conviction or
sentence that the Constitution deprives the State of power to impose.” (citing Mackey v.
United States, 401 U.S. 667, 693 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgments in part and
dissenting in part))).
299. See supra note 117 (discussing floodgate risks).
300. See Russell, supra note 79, at 135; supra note 25.
301. These include both state and federal inmates, as the “made retroactive by the
Supreme Court” language applies to both state and federal inmates seeking to file successive
habeas motions. See supra Part I.C.
302. See supra Part I.C.
303. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
304. See In re Lott, 366 F.3d 431, 432–33 (6th Cir. 2004).
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claims a chance at liberty—liberty to which they are equitably and legally
entitled.

